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Abstract
This thesis studies the emergence of, and the interaction between, inequality
in earnings and inequality in wealth, when labour markets are frictional.
Chapter 1 investigates the implications of search frictions and human-capital
accumulation for the equilibrium distribution of wages when firms invest optimally
in match-specific productivity. Optimal investment choice is incorporated in a
framework along the lines of Burdett et al. (2011) and equilibrium is characterised.
The effect of the rate of human capital accumulation on equilibrium dispersion of
firm productivities and wages is analysed in a numerically solved version of the
model.
Chapter 2 studies the empirical relationship between wealth and two labour
market outcomes - re-employment wages and unemployment durations. The anal-
ysis complements a closely related literature by exploiting new data from the
Survey of Income and Program Participation. As in prior studies, negative rela-
tionship between net worth and hazard rates to employment is documented. In
disagreement with prior studies, the relationship between re-employment wages
and net worth is found to be non-monotonic and it is argued that prior findings
likely result from misspecification. The implications of the relationship serve as a
motivation for the third chapter.
Chapter 3 (joint with Melvyn Coles) presents a model of the consumption-
leisure tradeoff for risk-averse workers when labour markets are frictional. Optimal
behaviour is that of a life-cycle consumer - work when young and save for retire-
ment (non-participation) later - planning retirement efficiently. The analysis has
highly tractable implications for wealth dynamics which emphasise life-cycle mo-
tives, labour-market decisions, persistent differentials in ability and heterogeneity
in initial wealth. The model’s empirical relevance is assessed; it is demonstrated
that it provides an empirically convincing explanation for much of the between-
households inequality in wealth.
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Chapter 1
On-the-Job Search, Human
Capital Accumulation and
Endogenous Firm Productivity
1.1 Introduction
When workers’ productivity increases with experience, ex-ante identical firms in
a frictional labour market characterised by churning have differential pay policies,
not only because higher pay retains workers for longer but also because it implies
that firms attract more experienced work-force in equilibrium (Burdett et al.,
2011). It has been long recognized that the relationship between pay policies
and turnover provides incentives for firms to also differentiate themselves in terms
of productivity (Mortensen, 2000; Acemoglu and Shimer, 2000; Quercioli, 2005;
Mortensen, 2005). Intuitively, a firm whose workers are less likely to quit gains
by investing in the productivity of the match (or in the workers’ human capital)
implying positive relationship between firm productivity and wage offers. The
possibility of endogenous determination of productive differentials across firms is
interesting because empirically these differentials are large and persistent (Bar-
telsman and Doms, 2000; Lentz and Mortensen, 2008) and essential for improving
1
the fit of standard models of wage dispersion (Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002).
This paper studies firms’ pay policies and decisions to invest in match-specific
productivity in a labour market where workers accumulate human capital through
experience and search randomly. Since high-paying firms see their workers quit
less often and also attract more experienced workforce they have incentive to
make larger productivity investments; given that their productivity is higher (both
match productivity and average productivity of workers) they tend to pay higher
wages. Such feedback links the rate of human capital accumulation and the prop-
erties of the technology transforming investment into productivity gains to the
equilibrium distribution of pay policies, firm productivities, and wages.
To address the question I present a steady-state model of frictional labour
market featuring on-the-job search, human capital accumulation, matching and
job-creation, and a firm-level decision to invest in productive capacity. The envi-
ronment is closely related to Burdett et al. (2011) and, in particular, the supply-
side of the labour market is identical to the more recent generalization by Burdett
et al. (2016). Workers enter the market with different ex-ante abilities, accu-
mulate human capital exponentially while employed, search randomly for em-
ployment when unemployed and for better-paying employment when employed.
As in Burdett et al. (2016) meeting rates of employed and unemployed work-
ers differ by a constant fraction, but in addition depend on equilibrium market
tightness. Firms create ”job sites” which at any point in time are either vacant or
filled1. Upon entry a vacancy commits to a time-invariant job-specific investment,
which determines its productivity once matched and flow cost while vacant, and
piece-rate2 paid to any employee following a match. I characterize the steady-
state equilibrium and, in particular, show that higher-paying firms invest more
in match-specific productivity. I then parameterize the model consistently with
1As I abstract from issues of firm size, the term ”firm” refers to one of these job sites.
2As human capital accumulation implies that the productivity of a match changes over time,
modelling explicitly how the total product is divided between worker and firm is challenging.
The assumption of piece-rate offers (also used in other studies such as Bagger et al. (2014) and
Fu (2011)) circumvents the difficulty.
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Burdett et al. (2016) and investigate numerically how the rate of human capital
accumulation and the parameters related to investment affect equilibrium disper-
sion of productivity and piece-rate offers. The results imply that high rates of
accumulation and high returns to investment imply more disperse and positively
skewed offer distributions, and have quantitatively large effect.
The labour market environment in this paper is most closely related to Burdett
et al. (2016) and Burdett et al. (2011) but differs insofar as I focus on endogenous
productivity dispersion and job-creation. Firms’ decision to invest in productivity
at the point of posting a vacancy closely resembles the setup in Mortensen (2000)
but there workers do not accumulate human capital. By merging these two ideas,
the analysis here contributes to the literature by emphasising the interaction be-
tween human-capital accumulation, pay policies, and productivity investment in
the determination of equilibrium distribution of earnings and firm productivity.
To the extent that growth rates of human capital (i.e. the steepness of the learn-
ing curve) differ across labour-market segments3, wage and productivity dispersion
will also differ. Furthermore, if the rates of human capital accumulation or the
cost/return to investment in productivity for firms can be affected by policy, the
analysis here presents a framework for evaluating its distributional consequences.
On the other hand, my emphasis on the interaction between human capital
accumulation, pay policies and investment in productivity, is similar to Fu (2011)
but the analysis here differs in two important respects. First, I model human
capital accumulation as universal (learning-by-doing) while Fu (2011) emphasises
its emergence as a consequence of costly firm-specific training decision. Second,
I model investment in productivity as match-specific, while in her model a firm
investing in training increases its workers’ general human capital. While the main
question of interest is very similar, the underlying assumptions are, in a sense,
diametrically opposed.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 formulates the model. Sections 1.3
3For example, Bagger et al. (2014) show that it differs substantially by education, with most
educated workers observing largest growth rates.
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and 1.4 state the optimisation problem of workers and firms respectively. Section
1.5 defines steady-state equilibrium and the latter is characterised in Section 1.6.
Section 1.7 presents the results from the numerical analysis. Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Environment
Time is continuous. A continuum of heterogeneous workers, normalized to unit
mass, and a continuum of ex ante identical firms interact in a frictional labour
market. All agents are risk-neutral and discount the future at rate, r. The system
is in steady state.
Workers enter the labour market unemployed, with no experience, and with
different initial productive abilities, summarised by the random variable, . At a
constant Poisson rate, φ, a worker leaves the labour market for good. New workers
enter the labour force at the same rate, implying that the distribution of  among
workers, A(), is time-invariant.
A worker’s productivity is summarised by an individual-specific variable, y,
determined by ability and experience. For a worker of ability  who has been
employed for x years
y(, x) = eρx
Human capital is general, accumulates at a constant rate, ρ, during employment
and does not depreciate. To prevent infinite accumulation, assume φ > ρ.
Both employed and unemployed workers search. An unemployed worker meets
a random vacancy at Poisson rate λu(θ), while an employed worker meets a ran-
dom vacancy at Poisson rate λe(θ). The number of meetings in the economy is
determined by a matching technology and market tightness, θ, is the ratio of va-
cancies to effectively searching workers4. I assume λu > λe and λ ≡ λe/λu, the
relative search intensity of employed as compared to unemployed workers, to be
4During most of Sections 1.3 and 1.4 explicit notational reference to market tightness is
suppressed for brevity.
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constant.
Firms create ”job sites” (Mortensen, 2000) which at any point in time are either
vacant or filled. As I abstract from issues of firm size, the term ”firm” refers to
one of these job sites. A firm enters the labour market by posting a vacancy,
simultaneously chooses the productivity of its job opening and commits to paying
a constant fraction τ ∈ (0, 1) of the future match product to any prospective
employee. To set ideas, imagine that the firm opens a vacancy by investing in
capital, k, and the investment maps into a unique time-invariant firm-specific
productivity, p(k). To capture the idea that investment is costly, assume that
while still vacant, a more productive firm incurs a larger flow cost, c(k), perhaps
because of expenses necessary to preserve productive capacity when a job is still
idle5. Assume p′(.) > 0, p′′(.) < 0, limk→∞ p′(k) = 0, c′(.) > 0, and c′′(.) ≥ 0
(see below). A vacancy meets random workers at rate η(θ) and becomes a ”job”
upon meeting a worker who accepts the match. Jobs are destroyed exogenously
at a Poisson rate, δ, or when the matched worker finds better-paid employment.
Upon destruction the job becomes a vacancy (with the same amount of capital)
while the worker becomes unemployed (upon exogenous destruction) or transits
to higher-paid employment. In equilibrium free entry drives the value of posting
a vacancy to zero.
A firm of productivity p(k) matched with a worker of productivity y produce
flow of output p(k)y. The match product is shared according to the pre-specified
piece rate, τ - at each point of time the worker receives flow wage τp(k)y and
the firm receives flow profit (1− τ)p(k)y. For notational purposes, let z ≡ τp(k).
Assume that the flow of benefits to an unemployed worker is proportional to her
productivity, zb = by, where b is a policy-set parameter
6.
The flow of meetings between workers and vacancies is described by a matching
5Alternatively, one can think of c(k) as the opportunity cost of not filling a vacancy.
6This implies that unemployment benefits are proportional to a worker’s productivity, rather
than their most recent wage. The specification is preferred for analytical convenience - unem-
ployment income proportional to past wages will imply heterogeneity of reservation pay rates
among the pool of unemployed workers, an aspect from which the analysis here abstracts. For
a discussion see Burdett et al. (2011)
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technology, m(u, 1 − u, v), where u and v are the unemployment rate and the
measure of vacancies. Employed and unemployed workers are assumed 1-to-λ
perfect substitutes in the matching technology, that is m(u, 1 − u, v) = m(u +
λ(1−u), v). Accordingly let θ = v/(u+λ(1−u)) denote labour market tightness.
In what follows, I assume directly a Cobb-Douglas matching function of the form
m(u+ λ(1− u), v) = β(v)α[u+ λ(1− u)]1−α
In order for the number of meetings prescribed by the matching function to equal
the number of meetings accruing to workers, the meeting rates are related to
market tightness and the matching parameters in the following way7
η(θ) = m(1/θ, 1) = βθα−1
λu(θ) = m(1, θ) = βθ
α
λe(θ) = λλu(θ) = λβθ
α
1.3 Workers’ Behaviour
This section formulates the dynamic problem faced by workers and characterises
their optimal behaviour given any profile of firms’ behaviours (summarised by
the distribution of z across vacancies, F (z)) and labour market tightness. It is
important to notice that given z workers have no preference over individual firms’
combinations of payout policies (τ) and firm-specific productivities (p(k)). This
property is convenient because in turn will imply that given z a firm’s equilibrium
turnover is independent of k which yields a tractable investment problem. For the
same reason the workers’ problem is identical to the one in Burdett et al. (2016).
For completeness, I state the workers’ problem, its solution, and discuss the main
intuition but do not state the proofs explicitly as they can be found in Burdett
7This is a standard specification of matching function in the context of on-the-job search;
for example see Dolado et al. (2009)
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et al. (2016).
Let WU(y|F (.), θ) be the lifetime utility of an unemployed worker with pro-
ductivity y given offer distribution F (z) and tightness, θ; let WE(y, z|F (.), θ) be
the lifetime utility of a worker with productivity y employed at z and facing offer
distribution F (z). Recall that the offer distribution and tightness are determined
in equilibrium.
An unemployed worker with productivity y faces random death risk, discounts
the future, receives flow income by and meets firms at rate λu. Upon meeting
a vacancy she decides whether to match based on a comparison of her expected
lifetime utilities under unemployment and under employment at that firm. The
Bellman equation for the value of unemployment is then
(r + φ)WU(y|.) = by + λu
z¯∫
z
max
[
WE(y, z′|.)−WU(y|.), 0] ∂F (z′) (1.1)
A worker with productivity y employed at a firm paying z faces random death
and job destruction risks, discounts the future, receives flow income zy, accumu-
lates human capital and meets new vacancies at rate λe. Upon meeting a new
vacancy the worker compares her expected lifetime utilities under her current em-
ployer and under the one just met and chooses optimally (assuming that a worker
never optimally quits into unemployment - which is true in equilibrium). Since
working at higher piece rate is always better for the worker, the value of employ-
ment increases with z. Therefore, it is immediate that a worker quits a firm to
match with another firm if and only if the new firm offers higher z. We also adopt
the convention that if a worker is offered exactly her current z she remains with
the incumbent firm. The Bellman equation for the value of employment is then
(r + φ + δ)WE(y, z|.) = zy + δWU(y|.) + ∂W
E(y, z|.)
∂y
ρy +
+ λe
z¯∫
z
max
[
WE(y, z′|.)−WE(y, z|.), 0] ∂F (z′) (1.2)
7
Denote q(z) ≡ φ+ δ+ λe(1−F (z)), the rate at which a worker employed at z
leaves her employer. The optimal behaviour of a worker as implied by (1.1) and
(1.2) is then completely characterised by the following
Claim 1. Optimal workers’ behaviour is fully described by a set of reservation
values of z for employed and unemployed workers.
1. The reservation value of an employed worker is her current z.
2. The reservation value for an unemployed worker, zR, satisfies
(r + φ)zR(F (z), θ) = (r + φ− ρ)b+ (1.3)
+ [λu(r + φ− ρ)− λe(r + φ)]
z¯∫
zR
1− F (z′)
q(z′) + r − ρ∂z
′
3. Sufficient condition for existence and uniqueness of a solution is z¯ > b(r +
φ− ρ)/(r + φ)
Proof. See Proposition 1 in Burdett et al. (2016).
The main arguments behind the proof are the following. First, WU(y) is
independent of z and WE(y, z) is increasing in z. Therefore, worker behaviour
is indeed described by cutoff, or reservation values of z, at which she optimally
changes states. Second, since all payoffs are proportional to y, then so are the
value functions. That is, there exist real valued αU and αE(z) such that
WU(y) = αUy, and WE(y, z) = αE(z)y
Proposition 1 can be then proved by substituting the latter back into the value
functions, evaluating at zR and solving the resulting system of equations. The
proportionality of the value functions to y implies that the reservation value of an
unemployed worker does not depend on her productivity. The latter is due to the
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fact that workers are paid in piece rates and that human capital accumulates at
constant rate.
When there is no learning by doing, ρ = 0, and unemployed and employed
workers search at the same intensity, λe = λu, (1.3) implies that z
R = b. When
ρ = 0 and λe < λu, (1.3) implies that z
R > b, because by entering into em-
ployment a worker forgoes the opportunity to search at a higher intensity, hence
making unemployment relatively more valuable. Positive rate of human capital
accumulation, ρ > 0, makes employment relatively more valuable and, therefore,
decreases the reservation value of z. At a sufficiently high ρ, the implied zR may
even become negative - workers might be willing to pay in order to be able to stay
in employment and accumulate experience.
1.4 Firms’ Behaviour
I now turn attention to the optimal behaviour of firms, taking the reservation
value of workers, zR, and market tightness, θ, as given. Let J(z, k, , x) be the
value to a firm with capital, k, paying z from being matched with a worker with
initial ability  and experience x. Let V (z, k) be the value to a firm from posting
a vacancy with capital k committed to paying z.
A firm with capital k, paying according to z, matched with a worker of
productivity y produces an instantaneous flow p(k)y and receives flow profit
(p(k)−z)y = (p(k)−z)eρx. It discounts the future, gets more productive over time
due to human capital accumulation, and becomes vacant if exogenously destroyed
or its worker quitted. Its value is therefore implicitly defined by the ordinary
differential equation
(r + q(z))J(z, k, , x) = (p(k)− z)eρx + ∂J(z, k, , x)
∂x
+
(δ + λe(1− F (z)))V (z, k) (1.4)
Solving (1.4) (integrating by parts with respect to x over the interval [x,∞), using
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an integration factor e−(r+q)x and assuming limx′→∞ J(., x′)e−(r+q(.))x = 0) yields
J(z, k, , x) =
(p(k)− z)eρx
q(z) + r − ρ +
δ + λe(1− F (z))
q(z) + r
V (z, k) (1.5)
Direct examination then confirms that indeed limx′→∞ J(., x′)e−(r+q(.))x = 0.
A vacancy that invested k and committed to pay according to z incurs a flow
cost c(k) and meets a random worker at Poisson rate η(θ). The value of a vacancy
offering {z, k} is then given by
(r + η(θ))V (z, k) = −c(k) + η(θ)M(z, k)
where M(z, k), the expected value from a match, is an appropriately weighted
average of the job value (see (1.12)). The firm chooses its {z, k} upon entering
the market so that its vacancy value is maximised. The Bellman equation for a
vacancy is then
(r + η(θ))V = max
z,k
{−c(k) + η(θ)M(z, k)} (1.6)
Given free entry, V is driven down to 0 in equilibrium.
1.5 Equilibrium
Let U , N (x), and H(x, z) be the unemployment rate, the distribution of expe-
rience among unemployed workers, and the joint distribution of experience and z
among employed workers of ability , respectively.
Definition A steady-state equilibrium is a set of pay and investment policy pairs,
Z×K, an offer distribution, F (z), over Z, associated distribution of productivities,
a reservation offer rate, zR, unemployment rate, U , steady state distributions,
N (x) and H(x, z), and market tightness, θ, such that
• Given F (z) and θ, the reservation offer rate, zR, is given by (1.3); worker’s
10
behaviour is optimal.
• Given zR, F (z), and θ,
{z, k} = arg max
z,k
V (z, k),∀{z, k} ∈ Z ×K
The behaviour of each firm is individually optimal.
• The distribution of offers, F (z), is consistent with individual firms’ optimal
offer policies.
• U , N (x), and H(x, z) are consistent with equilibrium turnover given op-
timal behaviour and market tightness.
• The market tightness, θ, is such that the free entry condition holds
0 = V ≡ V (z, k),∀{z, k} ∈ Z ×K
1.6 Characterisation
1.6.1 Turnover and distributions
To characterise equilibrium, I first derive expressions for U , N (x), and H(x, z).
Notice that conditional on z, turnover is independent of firms’ investment deci-
sions.
Consider U . The inflow of workers to this pool over a time interval of length
dt is (φ+δ(1−U ))dt (new labour-market entrants and previously employed work-
ers whose jobs were destroyed) with associated outflow (λu + φ)dtU
 (previously
unemployed workers who became employed or left the labour market). Equating
the flows yields a steady-state unemployment rate
U ≡ U  = φ+ δ
φ+ δ + λu
(1.7)
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which is independent of ability, .
Consider N (x), the pool of unemployed workers of type  with experience
below x. The inflow of workers to this pool is (φ + δ(1 − U)H(x, z¯))dt (new
labour-market entrants or previously employed workers with experience below x
whose jobs were destroyed) and the outflow is (φ + λu)dtUN(x) (this pool is
only left through transitions to employment or non-participation, as experience is
constant during an unemployment spell), yielding
N(x) =
φ(φ+ δ + λu) + δλuH(x, z¯)
(φ+ λu)(φ+ δ)
(1.8)
Consider H(x, z), the pool of workers of type  with experience no more than x
earning at rate no more than z. The inflow to this pool is UN(x)λudt (previously
unemployed workers of experience below x who found a job) and outflow
(1− U)H(x, z)q(z)dt+ (1− U)(H(x, z)−H(x− dt, z)) +O(dt2)
(the first term describes workers who transited to unemployment, non-participation
or employment at rate above z; the second term describes those who remained
employed at rate below z but accumulated experience above x; O(dt2) accounts
for the fact that some workers both accumulated experience above x and left em-
ployment at pay rate below z, but this term is of order dt2). Equating inflow
to outflow and rearranging yields the first-order ordinary differential equation in
H(x, z)
(φ+ δ)N(x)F (z) = q(z)H(x, z) +
∂H(x, z)
∂x
(1.9)
which can be solved by directly integration using factor eq(z)x. By solving simulta-
neously (1.8) and (1.9) closed-form expressions for the steady-state distributions
are obtained. Given θ and F (.) all flows are determined by the worker’s problem
and therefore the steady-state distributions are identical to the ones in Burdett
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et al. (2016) where further elements of the derivation are discussed in detail. In
particular, U, N(x), and H(x, z) are independent of the worker’s type, , and
H(x, z) ≡ H(x, z) = (φ+ δ)F (z)
q(z)
[
1− e−q(z)x]− (1.10)
− δλuF (z)
δλu + λe(1− F (z))(φ+ λu)
[
e−
φ(φ+δ+λu)
φ+λu
x − e−q(z)x
]
N(x) ≡ N (x) = 1− δλu
(φ+ λu)(φ+ δ)
e−
φ(φ+δ+λu)
φ+λu
x (1.11)
1.6.2 Value of a vacancy
Upon entering the market a vacancy chooses k (which determines its flow cost
during recruitment and affects the product of any future match) and posts z
(which affects the probability that a future match will be left by a worker, but
also the distribution of experience among workers among whom the firm recruits).
Since search is random, a vacancy meets a random worker. If it offers z < zR no
worker accepts; if it offers z ≥ zR, all unemployed workers, as well as all workers
employed at z′ < z accept. Notice that firm’s expected turnover is independent
of k conditional on z. Then the expected job value for a vacancy offering {z, k} is
M(z, k) =
∫
′
λuU
′
λuU 
′ + λe(1− U ′)
(∫ ∞
x′=0
J(., ′, x′|.)dN ′(x′)
)
dA(′) + (1.12)
+
∫
′
λλuU
′
λuU 
′ + λe(1− U ′)
(∫ ∞
x′=0
∫
z′∈[zR,z)
J(., ′, x′|.)dH′(x′, z′)
)
dA(′)
whenever z ≥ zR and
M(z, k) = 0
for z < zR.
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Given equations (1.7), (1.11), (1.10) and (1.5) a closed form expression for the
expected value of a job for a vacancy posting given {z, k} can be obtained. To de-
rive it I conduct the integration in (1.12) directly (full workings are demonstrated
in Appendix 1.A) and after imposing the free entry condition in (1.6), it follows
that for all z ∈ [z, z¯]
0 = −c(k) + η(θ)˜(φ+ δ + λu)
(φ+ δ + λe)
[
p(k)− z
q(z) + r − ρ
] [
a0 + λa1
F (z)
q(z)− ρ
]
(1.13)
where
a0 =
φδλu
(φ+ λu)(φ(φ+ δ + λu)− ρ(φ+ λu))
a1 =
φ(φ+ δ − ρ)λu
(φ(φ+ δ + λu)− ρ(φ+ λu))
˜ =
∫

′dA(′)
A firm choosing z faces a tradeoff: a lower z means higher profit flow whoever the
firm is matched with; a higher z means lower probability of the worker leaving the
firm and also higher expected productivity of the match. For future references,
let a(z) ≡ a0 + λa1F (z)/(q(z)− ρ).
1.6.3 Investment choice
I now turn to the optimal choice of investment, k. Suppose that the pair {z∗, k∗}
is an optimal policy. Since z∗ is optimal, the envelope theorem implies that
the optimal choice of k requires (differentiating (1.13) with respect to k at the
optimum)
ck(k
∗) =
η˜(φ+ δ + λu)
(q(z∗) + r − ρ)(φ+ δ + λu)
[
a0 + λa1
F (z∗)
q(z∗)− ρ
]
pk(k
∗) (1.14)
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It is easy to see that the restrictions on p(.) and c(.) guarantee that the latter
identifies a maximum and the solution is unique. Furthermore, combining (1.13)
and (1.14) yields
z∗ = p(k∗)− pk(k∗) c(k
∗)
ck(k∗)
(1.15)
The right-hand side is strictly increasing in k and therefore (1.15) describes a
one-to-one mapping between z and k irrespective of the functional form of F (.).
By offering higher pay rates a vacancy expects to match with more productive
workers and also to keep them for longer. Since their productivity augments its
own, it finds investment in capital more profitable - firms that offer high pay
rates invest more in capital. Henceforth, let k(z) denote the optimal choice of
investment for a firm offering z, and let p(z) ≡ p(k(z)) and c(z) ≡ c(k(z)).
1.6.4 Offer distribution
I now characterise the equilibrium distribution of z. First, notice that all vacancies
yield zero value in expectation and in particular the value from offering zR is the
same as from offering the highest equilibrium rate z¯. Equating V (zR, k(zR)) to
V (z¯, k(z¯)) (assuming non-degenerate distribution) yields an expression for the
highest equilibrium offer, z¯ in terms of zR, which can be conveniently expressed
as
(
p(z¯)− z¯
c(z¯)
)
=
(
p(zR)− zR
c(zR)
)
δ(φ+ δ + r − ρ)
(δ + λ(φ+ λu))(φ+ δ + λe + r − ρ) (1.16)
Notice that given (1.15), the restrictions on p(.) and c(.) guarantee that (p(z) −
z)/c(z) is invertible, and for each level of tightness and zR, (1.16) determines a
unique z¯.
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Next, equating V (z, k(z)) to V (zR, k(zR)) yields
(
a0
q(z) + r − ρ + a1
λF (z)
(q(z) + r − ρ)(q(z)− ρ)
)
=
=
p(zR)− zR
c(zR)
c(z)
p(z)− z
a0
φ+ δ + λe + r − ρ
Denoting the right-hand side by b0(z) the latter can be restated as the quadratic
equation in F
b0λ
2
eF
2 − [b0(2(φ+ δ + λe − ρ) + r)λe + (λa1 − λea0)]F +
(φ+ δ + λe − ρ)[b0(φ+ δ + λe + r − ρ)− a0] = 0
with discriminant
D = (b0λer + (λa1 − λea0))2 + 4b0λe(φ+ δ + λe − ρ)a1 > 0
and roots
F1,2 = 1 +
r + 2(φ+ δ − ρ)
2λe
+
φ
2b0λe(φ+ λu)
±
√
D
2b0λeλu
(1.17)
The root consistent with F being distribution is the smaller of the two (the
other one exceeds one). The equilibrium offer distribution is therefore determined
uniquely given zR and θ.
1.6.5 Tightness
Finally, equilibrium tightness is determined by the free entry condition. Evalu-
ating (1.13) at z = zR, expressing the matching rates in terms of tightness, and
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discarding the no-trade solution (dividing both sides of the equation by θα) yields
θ1−2α =
φδβ2˜[(φ+ δ + βθα)/(φ+ δ + λβθα)][p(zR)− zR]/c(zR)
(φ+ δ + λβθα + r − ρ)(φ+ βθα)(φ(φ+ δ + βθα)− ρ(φ+ βθα)) (1.18)
Notice that the right-hand side is positive, continuously decreasing in θ and ap-
proaches zero as θ limits to infinity. The behaviour of the left-hand side expression,
however, depends on the sign of (1 − 2α). It is immediate that α < 0.5 is suffi-
cient (but not necessary) for existence of a unique θ(zR) > 0 and given this the
relationship between θ and zR is negative
8. Further, notice that as zR limits to
infinity, the solution to (1.18) limits to zero9.
1.6.6 Existence
Equilibrium is now fully characterised. To summarize, given zR market tightness
is determined by (1.18). Given θ and zR, (1.17) determines the offer distribution.
Given F (.) and θ, (1.3) determines zR. Further, for each z ∈ [zR, z¯] the asso-
ciated optimal capital investment is determined by (1.15) and the steady-state
distributions are given by the results in Section 1.6.1.
Given this, an equilibrium is a zero of the function T (zR) defined as
T (zR) ≡ (r + φ)[zR − zR(F (z|zR), θ(zR))] = (1.19)
= (r + φ)zR − (r + φ− ρ)b−
−[λu(θ|zR)(r + φ− ρ)− λe(θ|zR)(r + φ)]
z¯(zR)∫
zR
1− F (z′|zR)
q(z′|zR) + r − ρdz
′
where zR(F (.), θ) is the solution to (1.3), θ(zR) is the solution to (1.18) and
8Establishing a weaker sufficient condition analytically is hindered by the complexity of the
expression and is not pursued. In the numerical exercises below I find that a unique solution
obtains under every parameterisation used.
9As (p(zR)− zR)/c(zR) = p′(zR)/c′(zR) limits to zero as long as limz→∞ p′(z) = 0.
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F (z|zR) is the solution to (1.17). Notice that
T ((r + φ− ρ)b/(r + φ)) < 0
(as search has option value) and
lim
zR→∞
T (zR) = +∞
as (1.18) implies that θ approaches zero in the limit. As T (.) is continuous, a
disperse equilibrium with zR > (r + φ − ρ)b/(r + φ) exists. The latter, however,
need not be unique for any values of the parameters. Differentiating (1.19) with
respect to zR yields
TzR = (r + φ)− ∂θ∂zRβαθ
α−1[(r + φ− ρ)− λ(r + φ)]
z¯(zR)∫
zR
1− F (z′|zR)
q(z′|zR) + r − ρdz
′
+
[(r + φ− ρ)− λ(r + φ)]βθα
φ+ δ + λe + r − ρ
− [(r + φ− ρ)− λ(r + φ)]βθα
z¯(zR)∫
zR
∂
∂zR
[
1− F (z′|zR)
q(z′|zR) + r − ρ
]
dz′
While the first three terms of the sum are positive, the last may be negative. This
being said, in the numerical exercise that follows unique disperse equilibrium
obtains under the parameterisation used.
1.7 Numerical analysis
This section presents the results from numerically solving the model and, in partic-
ular, discusses how equilibrium dispersion depends on the rate of human capital
accumulation and the parameters governing investment choice. The discussion
centres on the implications for offer and productivity distributions rather than
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the distribution of piece-rates or wages across employed workers. The equilibrium
distribution of offers has the immediate interpretation of the exact counterpart
of frictional wage dispersion - workers of the same ability and experience who
become employed simultaneously, draw initial wages from this distribution. The
overall wage distribution (among all employed or only the newly-employed) gener-
ated by this class of models is more complicated as it depends on the distributions
of experience among employed (which is endogenous) and on the distribution of
abilities in the population (which is primitive). As discussed in Burdett et al.
(2011) and Burdett et al. (2016) the wage density generated by the model inherits
the shape of the ability distribution, but some features, in particular related to
the right tail of the distribution depend crucially on the underlying dispersion.
1.7.1 Parameterization
I start by assuming that β = 1 and α = 0.5; that is the matching function is given
by
m(v, U + λ(1− U)) = v1/2(U + λ(1− U))1/2
and use this functional form for the calibration of the other parameters10. For the
search cost and productivity functions I choose the following functional forms11
c(k) = ck
p(k) = pkγ
Setting the time period equal to one month, I choose parameters following
Burdett et al. (2016). Accordingly I set r = 0.0041, implying annual interest rate
of 5 per cent; φ = 0.0021, consistent with average labour-market life of 40 years;
10It turns out that all following results are robust qualitatively to specifying different values
of the matching elasticity as long as α is not very close to 1.
11In this formulation, the choice of p matters in the determination of the other parameters
only as a scale factor. All the results that follow are reported using p = 1000.
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Figure 1.7.1: Fixed point for zR
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In a benchmark specification (necessary to calibrate the other parameters)
I set λ = λe/λu = 0.038/0.141, as estimated by Burdett et al. (2016) for a
sample of medium-skilled workers in the BHPS (this identifies λ and sets η for
the benchmark); ρ = 0.0020 as fitted there to match the observed mean-min ratio
with the one obtained in the model for the same sample; and γ = 0.4. What
remains is to set b and c/˜ (c and ˜ are not separately identified but the ratio
is sufficient for parameterising the model). As discussed in Burdett et al. (2016)
the ratio b/zR identifies uniquely the mean-min ratio generated by the model.
Further, notice that given tightness, c/˜ is uniquely determined as a function of
zR by the free entry condition (1.18). Using these observations, I identify the
two parameters as follows. Given any guess for zR, I set c/˜ consistently (given
tightness), solve the firms’ problem, set b consistently with the mean-min ratio
observed by Burdett et al. (2016) and check that the value from the guess is
consistent with the reservation z from the workers’ problem (1.3). I iterate until
T (zR) = 012. This procedure identifies b and c/˜.
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Table 1.7.1: Benchmark specification
Parameter/variable Value
Parameterized
β 1.0000
α 0.5000
λ 0.2695
λu 0.1410
λe 0.0380
η 7.0920
ρ 0.0019
γ 0.5000
p 1000.0000
Calibrated
b 448.6623
c/˜ 6094.0014
Endogenous variables
z¯ 1033.0102
zR 735.9138
k(z¯) 426.8667
k(zR) 2.1663
1.7.2 Results
Given the discussed parameterisation, I now present the results from solving the
model under different values of ρ and γ. As discussed above uniqueness of equi-
librium is not guaranteed in general. Under the proposed parameters, however,
equilibria are always unique. In particular, consider the following procedure.
Starting with a grid for zR, let zR0 denote an initial guess. Under the guess the
firms’ problem can be solved using (1.18) (identifying θ), (1.16) (identifying z¯
and (1.17) (identifying F (.|zR0 )). Given these (1.3) identifies a unique optimal
reservation value for workers given firm behaviour. Let zR1 denote the associated
solution. Then zR0 is an equilibrium if and only if z
R
0 = z
R
1 . Under the benchmark
specification (ρ = 0.0020 and γ = 0.4), Figure 1.7.1 plots zR0 and z
R
1 for different
values of zR0 . The figure illustrates that a unique fixed point exists and further
shows that over the closed interval of zR0 plotted T (z
R) behaves as a contraction.
12As discussed further this is feasible as for the chosen parameters T (.) behaves like a con-
traction. See below for further discussion.
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It turns out that the same applies for different values of ρ and γ. This suggests
the feasibility of numerically solving the differently parameterised versions of the
model by guessing zR, updating through (1.3) and iterating until convergence.
This is the method I follow.
To illustrate the relationship between dispersion and the rate of human capital
accumulation I set γ = 0.4 and solve the model for a number of different values
of ρ. The left panels of Figure 1.7.2 plot the resulting cumulative and density
distributions of offers (and productivity) over a normalized support. The top
panel of Figure 1.7.3 plots the limits of the support against ρ. The results suggest
that the distribution gets wider and more right-skewed as the rate of human-
capital accumulation increases. Markets characterised by high accumulation are
therefore likely to be described by more dispersion both in terms of productivity
and wages.
Similarly the right panels of Figures 1.7.2 and the bottom panel of 1.7.3 il-
lustrate the relationship between γ and the properties of the distribution. When
investment yields larger productivity increases, the resulting steady-state distri-
butions are more unequal. Both the shape and the support of the distributions are
highly sensitive and relatively large values of γ can generate extremely unequal
distributions.
Two important points should be discussed. First, in all cases the offer densities
are continuously decreasing. However, this does not imply that wage densities
are. While offer distributions are defined over z wages are further determined by
individual abilities and histories of experience. For example, if the distribution
of abilities is unimodal, then so will be the distribution of wages generated by
the model. Second, since each z corresponds to a unique p(k(z)), with increasing
relationship, the shape of the dispersion of z is always identical to the shape of
the distribution of productivities. This is a typical feature of models featuring
exogenous productivity dispersion (although here the direction of causality it is
not that more productive firms offer higher wages but firms that choose to offer
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Figure 1.7.3: Support of F (z)
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high wages also optimally choose to invest more in productivity). It should again
be qualified that the distributions are defined over z rather than wages and the
latter also depend on ability and experience. In particular, since more experienced
workers sort with more productive firms, the overall wage density (for workers of
the same ability) is more unequal than the distribution of firm productivities.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper presents a model of frictional labour markets where workers accu-
mulate experience while working, search both when unemployed and employed
and ex-ante identical firms create vacancies by making costly capital investments
in productivity while simultaneously committing to piece rates. In equilibrium,
firms with more generous pay policies also invest more and highly experienced
(and productive) workers sort with more productive firms. Numerical solutions
24
to the model demonstrate that equilibrium dispersion increases with the rate of
human capital accumulation and with the elasticity of productivity with respect
to capital investment. By varying the related parameters the model is able to
generate different equilibrium distributions including ones that are extremely un-
equal.
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Appendix
1.A Derivation of expected value of a job
This appendix derives the closed form expression for the expected value of a job
given {z, k}, that is
M(z, k) =
∫
′
λuU
′
λuU 
′ + λe(1− U ′)
(∫ ∞
x′=0
J(., ′, x′|.)dN ′(x′)
)
dA(′) + (1.20)
+
∫
′
λλuU
′
λuU 
′ + λe(1− U ′)
(∫ ∞
x′=0
∫
z′∈[zR,z)
J(., ′, x′|.)dH′(x′, z′)
)
dA(′)
First, notice that by the results from Section 1.6.1 the unemployment rate and
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steady state distributions are independent of . Plugging in (1.5)
M(z, k) =
λu
λuU + λe(1− U)
[∫
′
U
(∫ ∞
x′=0
(p(k)− z)′
q(z) + r − ρe
ρx′dN(x′)
)
dA(′) +
λ(1− U)
∫
′
(∫ ∞
x′=0
∫
z′∈[z,z)
(p(k)− z)′
q(z) + r − ρe
ρx′dH(x′, z′)
)
dA(′)
]
=
φ+ δ + λu
φ+ δ + λe
[
U
(p(k)− z)
q(z) + r − ρ
∫
′
′
(∫ ∞
x′=0
eρx
′
dN(x′)
)
dA(′) +
λ(1− U) (p(k)− z)
q(z) + r − ρ
∫
′
′
(∫ ∞
x′=0
eρx
′
∫
z′∈[z,z)
dH(x′, z′)
)
dA(′)
]
=
φ+ δ + λu
φ+ δ + λe
(p(k)− z)
q(z) + r − ρ
[
U
∫
′
′dA(′)
(∫ ∞
x′=0
eρx
′
dN(x′)
)
+
λ(1− U)
∫
′
′dA(′)
(∫ ∞
x′=0
eρx
′
Hx(x
′, z)dx′
)]
The first equality follows as λu
λuU+λe(1−U) =
φ+δ+λu
φ+δ+λe
, (p(k)−z)
q(z)+r−ρ is constant conditional
on {z, k}, and given x′, eρx′ does not vary with z. The second equality follows
because turnover is independent of , and because
∫
z′∈[z,z)
Hxz(x
′, z′)dz′ = Hx(x′, z)−Hx(x′, z) = Hx(x′, z)
Next, differentiating (1.11) and (1.10) with respect to x yields the densities
∂N(x)
∂x
=
φ(φ+ δ + λu)δλu
(φ+ λu)2(φ+ δ)
e−
φ(φ+δ+λu)
φ+λu
x
∂H(x, z)
∂x
=
F (z)φ(φ+ δ + λu)
δλu + λe(φ+ λu)(1− F (z)) ×[
δλu
φ+ λu
e−
φ(φ+δ+λu)
φ+λu + λe(1− F (z))e−q(z)x
]
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Using these above, the expressions for the integrals can be stated as
∞∫
x′=0
eρx
′
Nx(x
′)dx′ =
φδλu(φ+ δ + λu)
(φ+ λu)2(φ+ δ)
∫ ∞
x=0
e[ρ−
φ(φ+δ+λu)
φ+λu
]x′dx′
and
∞∫
x′=0
eρx
′
Hx(x
′, z)dx′ =
F (z)φ(φ+ δ + λu)
δλu + (φ+ λu)λe(1− F (z)) × δλu
φ+ λu
∞∫
x′=0
e(ρ−
φ(φ+δ+λu)
φ+λu
)x′dx′ + λe(1− F (z))
∞∫
x′=0
e(p−q(z))x
′
dx′

and direct integration yields
∞∫
x′=0
e(ρ−
φ(φ+δ+λu)
φ+λu
)x′dx′ =
φ+ λu
φ(φ+ δ + λu)− ρ(φ+ λu)
∞∫
x′=0
e(p−q(z))x
′
dx′ =
1
q(z)− ρ
Then after some basic manipulations
U
∞∫
x′=0
eρx
′
dN(x′) = a0
and
λ(1− U)
∞∫
x′=0
eρx
′
Hx(x
′, z)dx′ = λa1
F (z)
q(z)− ρ
as in (1.13).
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Chapter 2
Wealth and Labor Market
Outcomes: Evidence from the
SIPP 1996-2000
2.1 Introduction
Under incomplete insurance, accumulated wealth can serve as a cushion for smooth-
ing consumption when income is temporarily low, in particular, during spells of
unemployment. In search models this implies a relationship between wealth and
the behaviour of the unemployed. Intuitively, a wealthy worker can sustain con-
sumption over a long non-employment spell and can afford to be more selective
when presented with a job opportunity. On the other hand, a wealth-poor worker
needs to escape unemployment quickly even at the cost of accepting less appealing
job offers. This intuition was first formalized by Danforth (1979) in an environ-
ment along the lines of McCall (1970) where workers are risk-averse. He demon-
strated that under DARA preferences reservation wages increase with wealth,
with the implication that wealthy workers experience longer unemployment spells
and end up working at better-paying jobs. More recent work, including Lentz
and Tranaes (2005), Rendon (2006), Lise (2013), and Eeckhout and Sepahsalari
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(2013), has investigated the relationship between wealth and search behaviour
under more general environments. A universal prediction from the above is that
unemployment durations increase with wealth. This is due to either a positive
effect of wealth on reservation wages or a negative effect on search effort, or a
combination of both1.
A number of studies have investigated empirically the reduced form predic-
tions of this hypothesis. Bloemen and Stancanelli (2001) use data from the Dutch
Socio-Economic Panel from 1988-1989 with information on self-reported reserva-
tion wages and assets. They document that unemployed high-net-worth workers
report higher reservation wages and experience longer non-employment spells on
average. Alexopoulos and Gladden (2006), using US SIPP data from 1984-1987,
and Lammers (2014), using the Dutch DNB Household Survey data from 1993-
2008, document the same relationship. Algan et al. (2003) use French data from
the European Panel (collected by Eurostat) over 1993-1996 and document nega-
tive relationship between net worth and unemployment durations. These results
have been widely interpreted as direct evidence in favour of the theoretical models
above (Browning et al., 2007; Lentz, 2009).
This paper complements the above literature by investigating the empirical
relationship between workers’ household net worth, re-employment wages and
hazard rates out of non-employment in the 1996 panel of the Survey of Income
and Program Participation. The analysis here is very similar to the above, yet
differs in one important aspect. Rather than using self-reported reservation wages
(which are unavailable in the data) I use observed re-employment wages. There are
no theoretical reasons why reservation wages are superior to re-employment wages
1In Lentz and Tranaes (2005) wealth has no effect on reservation wages by construction
but has a negative effect on search effort in equilibrium. Lise (2013) develops a model along
the lines of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) featuring risk-averse workers and endogenous search
effort. While reservation wages are allowed to depend on wealth, he shows that in equilibrium
they don’t and behaviour is affected only through an effect on search effort. Eeckhout and
Sepahsalari (2013) consider a directed search model and show that under DARA preferences,
wealthy workers direct their search to more productive (and better paying) jobs where they also
face longer queues. In Rendon (2006) transition rates are exogenous (there is no search effort)
but reservation wages depend positively on wealth.
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as an object of study when interest lies in the relationship between wealth and
the decision to accept a job offer. A worker’s re-employment wage is by definition
higher than her reservation wage but if re-employment wages are systematically
higher for some group of the population it must be that so is the reservation wage.
Further, observed re-employment wages are objective, unlike self-reported reser-
vation wages, and are available for all workers who experience a transition from
non-employment into employment, while in all of the above studies information on
reservation wages is collected only from unemployed persons in few of the survey
waves. As a result I have significantly larger sample, which ultimately allows for
further flexibility in modelling the main relationships of interest.
In documenting the relationship between re-employment wages and net worth
I start with a specification identical to the one in Bloemen and Stancanelli (2001)
and obtain remarkably similar results - net worth enters the conditional mean
of log-wage through a quadratic polynomial and the estimates imply an increas-
ing concave relationship. However, non-parametric estimation of the underlying
relationship identifies a non-monotonic conditional mean - re-employment wages
decrease with net worth while the latter is negative (as for about 12 percent of
the households surveyed and 20 percent of the relevant estimation sample) and
then increase when positive. Re-employment wages are lowest not for the most
asset-poor workers but for those with close to zero net worth. I then demonstrate
that the pattern survives even after controlling for a broad range of observables
but disappears when accounting for past wages. I postpone my interpretation of
these results until later but at this stage assert that they are inconsistent with the
findings from the closely related literature above.
Next I estimate a proportional hazards model of the hazard rates out of non-
employment with respect to net worth. I find a negative relationship with the
caveat that workers with close to zero net worth experience on average longer
durations, of the same magnitude as those for wealthiest workers, conditional on
observables. Subject to this, the relationship between wealth and hazard rates is
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broadly consistent with the view that wealth affects search behaviour as predicted
by theory.
The exposition is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data used.
Section 2.3 discusses the relationship between re-employment wages and net worth.
Section 2.4 presents the analysis of hazard rates. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Data
I use data from the 1996 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation.
SIPP is a nationally representative, longitudinal, multi-stage stratified sample of
civilian, non-institutionalized US households. The survey has been conducted
since 1984 but comes in panels of length three or four years where different panels
sample different households. A household can be followed for four years at most.
A household is interviewed every four months (a wave) and data is collected
for each of the preceding four months (the reference period) for each household
member. During each interview a set of core questions on demographics, income
(from various sources), employment, program participation and others are asked.
In particular, within the core questionnaire respondents provide a weekly calendar
of employment status, as well as monthly earnings, hours worked, and further job
characteristics from up to two jobs. In addition, a set of different topical questions
are asked each wave.
The 1996 panel samples 36,730 households (95,300 individuals) over the period
1996-20002. A household is interviewed twelve times and during the third, sixth,
ninth, and twelfth wave detailed data on assets and liabilities are collected at both
household and individual level. Asset categories covered in the survey include
wealth in bank accounts, stocks/funds, private pension accounts (but not claims
to future Social Security benefits), vehicles, home and business equity, and other
wealth. Liabilities covered include credit card debt, loans and ”other debt”. A
household’s net worth is identified as the difference between all recorded assets
2These are the numbers from the first wave.
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and liabilities. Wealth measures used in the analysis are based on these records.
Appendix 2.B gives detailed information of the available asset and liabilities data.
During the first wave all respondents who were not employed at the beginning
of the reference period are asked when was the last time they worked. I use this
to identify the duration of non-employment for workers whose spell started before
the beginning of the panel. As a result the spell data used in Section 2.4 does
not suffer from problems of left censoring. At the first interview respondents are
also asked to report the total number of years they have worked for more than
six months. I use this as a basis measuring labour-market experience. In what
follows a worker’s labour market experience is therefore defined as the number of
years she has worked for at least six months.
In the SIPP hourly wages are only reported by workers compensated by the
hour, while monthly earnings (EPM), hours worked per week (HPW ) and weeks
in each month (WPM) are available for all observations3. Hence, for compara-
bility, I define a worker’s wage at month t as EPMit/(WPMtHPWit) (effective
hourly earnings). I define a worker’s re-employment wage as the average wage
received over the first two full months (t + 1 and t + 2) of an employment spell.
The hourly starting wage (Wt) is then
Wit =
WPMt+1
WPMt+1 +WPMt+2
EPMit+1
WPMt+1HPWit+1
+
WPMt+2
WPMt+1 +WPMt+2
EPMit+2
WPMt+2HPWit+2
The reason to focus only on initial wages (rather than, for example, average wage
over the observed duration of a spell) is to abstract from tenure-related wage
growth when employment spell durations vary across observations. Under this
convention transitions resulting in job spells shorter than two full months are
3The analysis here models wages rather than earnings for comparability with prior studies.
The empirical regularities documented, however, also hold if total monthly earnings are used as
regressand.
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excluded from the sample4.
All nominal variables (wealth, earnings, wages, and income from other sources)
are deflated by the CPI with base December, 19965. At each point in time the
assets of an individual are identified with the latest observed level of the assets
from the particular category.
Finally, as all surveys, data quality could be a concern in the SIPP. Particu-
larly relevant issues relate to the quality of wealth and employment status data.
Appendix 2.A discusses some of the surveys better known deficiencies and the
implications for my analysis.
2.3 Wealth and re-employment wages
This section turns attention to the relationship between workers’ re-employment
wages and their households’ net worth. To summarise the latter consider the
regression specification for an individual i who experienced a non-employment-to-
employment transition in month t
logWit = α + g(NWit−) + β2Dit + β3Pit + β4Oit + it (2.1)
where Wit is the starting wage of individual i defined above; NWit− is her house-
hold’s latest observed (prior to the associated non-employment-to-employment
transition) net worth; g(.) is a pre-specified functional form for the relationship of
interest; Dit, Pit, and Oit are vectors of demographic, productivity (such as educa-
tion), and outside-option related (such as the income of other household members)
characteristics. Recall that since assets are only observed annually, NWit− may
have been measured at any point between one week and twelve months prior to
the transition. Aside from Wit being a re-employment rather than reservation
4Some workers report flat earnings profiles during employment spells, while others report
sequences of higher and lower earnings depending on the number of weeks there are in a month.
I take two-month weighted average to correct for biases due to this discrepancy.
5Asset and liabilities are only available at yearly frequency. I deflate these by the CPI at the
time when they were observed. As a result their deflated levels only change at annual frequency.
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Table 2.3.1: Descriptive statistics: wage equations
Heads Spouses Heads Spouses
Wage 10.65 10.15 Education
Net worth 92075 95052 Elementary 0.04 0.04
Household size 3.46 3.59 < High school 0.15 0.13
Age 39.70 39.73 High school 0.32 0.33
Female 0.55 0.73 Some college 0.31 0.30
Race Undergraduate 0.12 0.15
White 0.80 0.87 Master’s + 0.04 0.04
Black 0.15 0.08 Professional 0.01 0.01
Other 0.05 0.06 Other
Marital Experience 18.09 16.96
Married 0.66 1.00 NE spell (wks) 6.34 7.16
Single 0.13 0.00 HH income 1758 2865
Divorced 0.21 0.00 Hours per week 35.76 33.39
Observations 4589 3355 4589 3355
”Wage” is re-employment wage; ”HH income” is the income of all other house-
hold members; ”NE spell” is the duration of the intervening spell of non-
employment.
wage, (2.1) is (up to differences in g(.) and specification of the control set) the
relationship estimated in the papers discussed in the introduction (Bloemen and
Stancanelli, 2001; Alexopoulos and Gladden, 2006; Lammers, 2014). Notice that
since NWit− is pre-determined there could be no question of causal influence run-
ning directly from Wit to NWit− but as long as factors that jointly determine Wit
and NWit− are absent from the control set, simultaneity is present.
The sample for estimation is restricted to individuals within family households
(household net worth may be uninformative in non-family households) and ver-
sions of (2.1) are estimated separately for household heads and spouses6. Further,
individuals who report to be retired or to suffer from work-preventing disabilities
at any point during the survey, are excluded. As wealth data is first recorded
in the third wave of the survey all observations from the first twelve months are
excluded. Subject to this the sample includes all workers that experienced a non-
employment-to-employment transition7 resulting in an employment spell of length
6Household head is defined as the individual who owns the household’s home or in whose
name rent is paid. This is different to the definition in Bloemen and Stancanelli (2001) where
the household head is the husband. Every household has a household head but not necessarily
a spouse.
7I define transitions with intervening non-employment of less than two weeks to be
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more than two months. This leaves 4589 observations for household heads and
3355 for spouses. Table 2.3.1 presents some descriptive statistics. The average
reemployment wage is higher for household heads while the average income of
other household members is higher for the spouses. These suggest that typically
the individual recorded as household head is the main earner in the observed
household. The average ages for the two groups are very close but household
heads have worked on average about a year more than the spouses. The observed
differences in education are small. Net worth is on average higher in households
where the spouse experienced a transition (likely because all these households
consist of married couples).
In what follows I report the results from estimating different versions of (2.1).
In all cases the equation is fitted by OLS and identifies the parameters of the
conditional mean. It should be noted, however, that the main results obtain
when the equation is estimated by median regression, weighted least squares8,
or by PPML when the wage, rather than its log, is modelled as an exponential
function of the linear index (see Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006)). For brevity,
the results from alternative estimation procedures are not reported in the text. All
following tables report the p-values obtained through heteroskedasticity-consistent
estimation of the standard errors. As discussed further, I also use two different
measures of wealth, depending on how home equity is handled, with little change
in results.
First, Table 2.3.2 reports the coefficients from a log-wage OLS regression us-
ing a specification identical (up to variable definitions) to the one in Bloemen
and Stancanelli (2001). The columns labelled B&S (2001) present Bloemen and
Stancanelli (2001)’s estimates while columns labelled SIPP present mine. The
employment-to-employment; those involving a longer intervening spells are defined as non-
employment-to-employment. This is in the tradition of previous work (e.g. Nagypa´l (2008)).
8The SIPP samples disproportionately from areas with high poverty and, in this sense, its
sample is not representative of the US population. Since sampling weights are available, WLS
estimation of (2.1) is feasible but it turns out that the results are very close to the ones obtained
by OLS, in terms of both coefficients and standard errors. A possible reason is that the covariates
(in particular, net worth) are highly correlated with the selection criteria.
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Table 2.3.2: Comparison to Bloemen and Stancanelli (2001)
Heads Spouses
B&S SIPP B&S SIPP
Any children 0.084∗ −0.0423 −0.10 −0.0057
Female −1.14∗∗ −0.435 −0.632
ln(Age) 4.95∗∗ 5.432∗∗∗ 7.75∗ 3.326∗∗∗
ln(Age)2 −0.67∗∗ −0.757∗∗∗ −1.09∗ −0.469∗∗∗
Unemployment income 0.044∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.09 0.172∗∗∗
Other income −0.0027 0.0141∗∗ −0.0025 0.0127∗∗
ln(Hours) −0.15∗∗ −0.0515 0.094 −0.0805
Educ2 0.018 0.111
∗∗∗ 0.093 0.139∗∗∗
Educ3 0.14
∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.12 0.213∗∗∗
Educ4 0.20
∗∗ 0.566∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗ 0.541∗∗∗
Female × ln(Hours) 0.31∗∗ 0.0277 0.0739
Net worth 0.029∗∗ 0.0145∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.0234∗∗
Net worth 2 −0.0012∗∗ −0.0015∗∗∗ −0.0019∗∗ −0.0003∗∗
House 0.10 0.0972∗∗∗ −0.060 0.124∗∗∗
Observations 284 4659 284 3396
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
- The income (wealth) variables in Bloemen and Stancanelli (2001) are measured in 1000s (10000s)
of 1984 Dutch guiders. The corresponding variables here are measured in 1000s (10000s) of 1996
US dollars.
results are remarkably similar (notice that all nominal quantities are measured in
different currencies and the equation is estimated in two different countries) and
imply a positive and convex relationship between wages and net worth. Perhaps
the most striking difference relates to the number of observations which differ by
factor of twenty.
Next, to assess the adequacy of quadratic relationship with respect to net
worth, Figure 2.3.1 presents scatterplots of the log-wage against net worth and
fits a locally weighted scatterplot fitting (LOWESS) curve through the data 9.
The observed relationship between log-wages and net worth is non-monotonic.
Starting from the left tail of the net worth distribution, mean wages decrease as
net worth increases and attain a minimum near zero net worth. Then as net worth
increases, log-wages increase again, at a decreasing rate. The pattern is observed
both for household heads and for spouses, but is somewhat more pronounced
9The graph shows the middle 98 % of the observations for net worth. The bandwidth is
set to 1000 dollars (deflated) - a reasonably small value given the support of the net worth
distribution.
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Figure 2.3.1: Wages and net worth
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for household heads. This suggests that quadratic polynomial in net worth is
inadequate specification for g(.) in (2.1). Not accounting appropriately for the
shape of the relationship could lead to misleading results - notice that about 19
percent of household heads and 20 percent of spouses in the estimation sample
have negative net worth (see Appendix 2.B).
Since non-parametric estimation with a large set of controls is computationally
infeasible I recode the continuous net worth variable into a categorical ordering
of households by net worth and use category indicators as regressors. In addi-
tion to inducing a semi-parametric flavour to the estimation this approach has
the advantage of reducing the influence of extreme net worth observations, and
improving the robustness of results to measurement issues associated with the
continuous wealth variables. I assign households into twelve net worth categories
in ascending order, allocating those with net worth between -100 and 100 dollars
into the third category. Appendix 2.B describes how the net worth categories are
created from the pooled asset data. Importantly, the net worth categories are not
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Table 2.3.3: Wage regression, household heads
Net worth (1) (2) (3) (4)
NW1 0.420∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗ 0.128∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.041)
NW2 0.225∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.0683 0.0386
(0.000) (0.001) (0.200) (0.477)
NW4 0.144∗∗ 0.103∗∗ 0.0576 0.0316
(0.002) (0.006) (0.157) (0.449)
NW5 0.266∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗ 0.0978∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.038)
NW6 0.333∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗ 0.125∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.016)
NW7 0.376∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
NW8 0.445∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NW9 0.498∗∗∗ 0.418∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗ 0.188∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.025)
NW10 0.666∗∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NW11 0.579∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
NW12 0.764∗∗∗ 0.712∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 4589 4589 4437 4437
p-values in parentheses
equally sized (Table 2.B.1).
Table 2.3.3 presents the coefficients on net worth category indicators (house-
holds close to zero net worth serving as reference category) from estimation of
four regression specifications nested by (2.1) for household heads (Tables 2.D.1
and 2.D.2 in the Appendix show the full specifications, including controls, for
household heads and spouses). The first specification (column (1)) only includes a
constant and the net worth indicators; column (2) includes demographic controls;
(3) includes productivity controls; (4) includes controls related to the worker’s
outside option. Household heads in the top (bottom) net worth category have on
average 76 (42) percent higher re-employment wages than workers close to zero
net worth. Similar results obtain for spouses. Observables explain about two-
thirds of the re-employment wage gap between top (bottom) and zero-net worth
workers but the qualitative pattern from Figure 2.3.1 is preserved after each round
of extra controls.
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One concern with measuring wealth by total household net worth is that it in-
cludes illiquid assets (in particular, home equity) that are conceivably unsuitable
for smoothing consumption10. To address this issue I consider an alternative defi-
nition of net worth which subtracts home equity from total net worth. It should be
noted that even this measure could be subject to the same criticism - for example,
it includes wealth in pension accounts which carry penalty upon early withdrawal.
Tables 2.D.5 and 2.D.6 (in the Appendix) report the coefficients on the net worth
categories for the same regression specifications as above but using this net worth
definition11. The results are very similar to before. The pattern identified above
is, therefore, not the result of treating home equity inappropriately.
A significant part of the relationship between wages and net worth is explained
by observable characteristics. To explore this more closely Table 2.3.4 reports the
mean values of a subset of the observables for households heads from different
net worth categories (Table 2.D.4 in the Appendix presents the same informa-
tion for spouses). Workers around zero net worth are on average the youngest;
least experienced, educated or likely to be married; most likely part of low-income
households. Towards the tails of the net worth distribution the incidence of char-
acteristics associated with high earnings increases steadily. Further, workers in the
bottom net worth categories have education profiles consistent with high earning
potential. The most striking difference between them and workers towards the
right end of the distribution is that the former are younger and less experienced.
To state this simply, the most asset-poor workers don’t have low re-employment
wages plainly because they are fundamentally high earners.
This is at odds with the findings of Bloemen and Stancanelli (2001), Alexopou-
los and Gladden (2006) and Lammers (2014). It is unlikely that the discrepancy
is due to the conceptual difference between reservation and re-employment wages
10While this criticism has some merit, it is probably extreme to think that a household’s
property value is fully irrelevant as a source of financing in face of unexpected events.
11The coefficients of the control variables are not reported to keep the tables concise but are
available upon request. Individuals are now grouped into only eleven categories but the third
group again contains individuals with zero net worth - for details see Appendix 2.B
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- if most asset-poor individuals report low reservation wages but somehow end
up working at high-paying jobs, their subjective assessment of reservation wages
is flawed. Another possibility is that the different results are due to differences
in sample selection. In particular, while I include unmarried household heads in
the estimation sample, some of the above studies do not. Table 2.D.3 (in the Ap-
pendix) estimates the equations only on the sample of married heads and shows
that this is not the case. Further, the results are obtained for different countries
(of the above only Alexopoulos and Gladden (2006) uses US data) and at country
level the underlying relationship could differ. A more likely explanation, however,
is that by imposing quadratic form for the underlying relationship, the long right
tail of net worth becomes extremely influential and drives the results. It is also
difficult to reconcile the results with the view that (2.1) identifies a causal effect
of wealth on re-employment (or reservation) wages. To make this claim one has to
assume that all factors that jointly determine wages and net worth (for example,
a workers permanent earnings and ability) are appropriately accounted for in the
control set. Direct inspection of the full list of controls in Table 2.D.1 reveals that
virtually all variables related to ability are discrete while the dependant variable
is continuous. One possibility for a continuous noisy measure of ability that could
serve as a proxy in (2.1) is past wages. For this two requirements should be sat-
isfied. First, past wages should be ignorable. From theoretical point of view, this
requirement is likely met12. The second requirement, that the correlation between
omitted ability and net worth is zero once past wage is partialed out, is more dif-
ficult to defend - for example, positive transitory component in past wages may
imply higher wealth at the time of the transition. While recognising this issue,
column (2) of Table 2.D.7 (in the Appendix) reports, proactively, the results from
a simple regression of the re-employment wage on net-worth-category indicators,
education, age, marital status and the average wage earned at a worker’s latest
12In the class of models discussed in the introduction past wages matter for an unemployed
worker’s reservation wage only insofar as they contain information of the worker’s earning po-
tential. However, it is easy to think of alternative environments where past wages have causal
effect on re-employment wages.
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employment spell prior to transition13. Past wages explain most of the variation
otherwise attributed to wealth, except for the three top net worth categories. If
one believes that the proxy is suitable (in particular, that transitory variations in
wages over the observed window can’t explain systematic movements between net
worth categories) the results suggest that wealth has essentially no effect on re-
employment wages over most of the net worth distribution. While suggestive, this
result’s causal interpretation should be taken with care in view of the discussion
above.
Irrespective of the exact nature of causal forces involved, the results demon-
strate unambiguously that the most asset-poor workers are young and highly edu-
cated high-earners. To investigate whether their liabilities could be attributed to
particular sorts of expenditure, Table 2.3.5 reports the average financial position
of household heads from the twelve net worth categories separately by asset group.
Households in the third net worth category hold less wealth and own less debt,
in almost every asset class, than other households. From there, both assets and
liabilities increase in value towards the tails of the net worth distribution. House-
holds in the bottom category are the only ones with negative, on average, home
equity position but their largest component of debt is loans (which is also dispro-
portionately large in comparison to its relative share of total liabilities across net
worth categories). ”Loans” corresponds to survey questions about ”student loans,
home-improvement loans, lines of credit besides credit card”. Given their age and
educational profile, it is sensible to conjecture that student loans dominate their
balance sheet. Unfortunately, no finer decomposition is available in the data and
at this stage this can’t be established unambiguously.
13As a preceding employment spell (of duration more than two months) is not observed for
many workers, the number of observations drops to 2771. Column (1) of Table 2.D.7 reports
the estimates over the same sub-sample from an identical regression excluding the past wage
and identifies the same pattern as Table 2.3.3.
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2.4 Wealth and the duration of non-employment
I now turn attention to the relationship between net worth and hazard rates to
employment. Starting from the pooled data, I exclude all individuals of age less
than 16 years, the retired and those reporting being unable to work because of
chronic health condition or disability. I transform the original data into a weekly
panel dataset where each individual’s employment status is observed weekly, core-
module variables are observed monthly, and assets are observed annually. The
SIPP reports five distinct employment states. I recode these so that they are
consistent with only two employment states (employment and non-employment).
As before, the amount of assets held by an individual at any week is identified
with the most recently observed amount (See Appendix 2.B).
Identification of spell durations for individuals observed continuously who were
employed in the first week of the first wave is straightforward. For those observed
continuously but not employed at the beginning of the first reference period, I
use data from the first-wave topical module where they report the last time they
worked. In about five percent of the relevant cases these records are missing
and I exclude the associated spells. Spells of individuals who left the sample for
some time and returned as non-employed are also excluded. As before, I exclude
non-employment spells shorter than two weeks (which I interpret as job-to-job
transitions). This leaves a final sample of 7313 non-employment spells (210443
weeks at risk) for household heads, with 4779 ending in employment, and 5942
spells (227918 weeks at risk) for spouses, 3603 ending in employment14. Median
exit times are 13 and 15 weeks respectively.
Figure 2.4.1 shows the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survivor function for
household heads from four different net worth categories (the others are omitted
for readability). While survival rates typically decrease with wealth, as before a
discontinuity occurs for households close to zero net worth who are least likely to
14Notice that the time-at-risk does not correspond to the number of weekly observations
reported later due to the spells whose duration was constructed using the first-wave topical
module.
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Figure 2.4.1: Survivor function by net worth, Kaplan-Meier
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transit into employment. Hence, in the regression specifications that follow I keep
on using net-worth-category indicators15.
To summarise the relationship between hazard rates out of non-employment
and net worth I use a discrete time approximation to the continuous time pro-
portional hazards model. Let θ(t,Xit, t) be the continuous time hazard rate for
an individual i with observed characteristics Xit and unobserved t who has been
non-employed for amount of time t. Under the proportional hazards assumption
this can be represented as
θ(t,Xit, it) = θ0(t)exp(β
′Xit + it) ≡ θ0(t)λit (2.2)
implying that all individuals share the same underlying pattern of time depen-
dence, summarized by θ0(t), the baseline hazard rate, and observed characteristics
15The estimated survival probabilities seem to discontinuously decrease at 18 weeks, and
exhibit less visible discontinuities every other 18 weeks. This pattern likely results from seam
bias in the data - the SIPP reference period is 4 months. The regression specifications that
follow account for this by attributing all discontinuities at the seams to seam bias.
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affect hazard rates by scaling λit. Both t and Xit are only observed at discrete
weekly intervals16. The probability that a worker is still not employed after j
weeks (the survivor probability) is
S(j,Xhij) = exp
(
−
∫ 1
0
θ0(u)λi1du− ...−
∫ j
j−1
θ0(u)λijdu
)
(2.3)
where
Xhij ≡ {Xij, Xi,j−1, ..., Xi1}
is the history of Xit for t ∈ {1, 2, ..., j}. An individual is still not employed after j
weeks if they did not experience a transition in the first, or second, ..., or j − 1’st
week.
The probability of a spell ending during week j (the discrete hazard rate) is
h(j,Xhij) =
S(j − 1, Xhi,j−1)− S(j,Xhij)
S(j − 1, Xhi,j−1)
A spell ends at week j if an individual is not employed in week j−1 but employed
in week j. Using (2.3) to substitute the survivor functions the discrete time hazard
can be expressed independently of history:
h(j,Xij) = 1− exp(−exp(β′Xij + γj + ij)) (2.4)
where
γj ≡
∫ j
j−1
θ0(u)du
is the discrete time counterpart of the baseline hazard rate. Therefore, subject
to appropriately accounting for γj the parameters in (2.2) are identified by a
16In fact, observed covariates only change at monthly (or for assets annual) frequency. How-
ever, this is unlikely to result in significant time aggregation bias as long as one treats the time
varying covariates as monthly averages.
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Table 2.4.1: C-log-log regression, household heads
Net worth (1) (2) (3) (4)
NW1 0.632∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗ 0.608∗∗∗ 0.510∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NW2 0.407∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
NW3 0.139 -0.0000103 0.223∗ 0.0861
(0.114) (1.000) (0.028) (0.411)
NW4 0.527∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗ 0.552∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NW5 0.391∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.002)
NW6 0.439∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
NW7 0.432∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NW8 0.289∗∗∗ 0.192∗ 0.282∗∗ 0.204∗
(0.001) (0.031) (0.002) (0.032)
NW9 0.255∗∗ 0.182∗ 0.258∗∗ 0.201∗
(0.005) (0.046) (0.006) (0.036)
NW10 0.209∗ 0.160 0.223∗ 0.179
(0.025) (0.090) (0.021) (0.069)
NW11 0.200∗ 0.166 0.181 0.145
(0.030) (0.072) (0.055) (0.130)
Observations 152147 152147 148712 148712
Standard errors clustered by individual. NW12 is reference category.
complementary log-log regression of the event that a transition occurs in week j
on the covariates (Jenkins, 2005).
To account for duration dependence I follow a semi-parametric piecewise-
constant approach - 26 indicator variables, corresponding to discrete intervals
of cumulative spell duration, are included as regressors. These are chosen so that
they are narrower towards the beginning of the spell, where the survivor function
has higher curvature. Appendix 2.C describes how the intervals are generated.
To insure that this way of modelling duration dependence is not inadequate I also
estimate the relationships through a Cox model, which imposes no specific form of
the duration dependence, with no significant change of results17. All results that
follow include these indicators but, for brevity, their coefficients are not reported.
17While valuable as a robustness check, the Cox model is best suited to continuous time
duration data.
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A well-known data-quality problem of the SIPP (and all other major surveys)
is seam bias (see Appendix 2.A) - unusually large proportion of labour market
transitions appear to occur at the seam between subsequent waves. To address
the issue I include as a regressor a variable which indicates whether a particular
week is the first week of a reference period. As a result, any significant difference
between the probability of a transition taking plays at the seams rather than at
other point of the reference period is attributed to bias.
Table 2.4.1 presents the net-worth coefficients from ML estimation of (2.4)
for household heads (Tables 2.D.8 and 2.D.9 in the Appendix report the full
specification for heads and spouses; Tables 2.D.10 and 2.D.11 report the results
when the alternative net-worth definition is used). All tables report regression
coefficients and, unlike the wage-regressions above, the top net-worth category
serves as reference. For household heads the hazard rate into employment declines
with net worth18, except for a sharp discontinuity around zero net worth where
hazard rates are very low and close to those of the wealthiest individuals. To get
a feeling of the magnitude of the differences, notice that in a c-log-log regression,
coefficients’ exponentiated values identify hazard ratios. For example, all else
equal, household heads from the bottom net-worth category have (e0.510−1) ≈ 67%
higher hazard rate than their wealthiest counterparts. For household heads the
results are robust with respect to net-worth concept.
The pattern for spouses is different. First, they tend to have overall longer non-
employment durations. Next, above the fifth net-worth category (and the second
when home equity is netted out) hazard rates do not differ significantly across
groups. Further, no discontinuity around zero net worth occurs - in fact, under
the benchmark net-worth definition hazard rates there are the highest, although
insignificantly different from those in the left tail. It should be noted that both
for household heads and for spouses, accounting for observable characteristics
does not affect the underlying relationship as significantly as in the case of re-
18While coefficients do not monotonically decline in value, they do not differ in statistical
significance sense between any two adjacent net-worth groups, except around the third category.
51
employment wages.
Except for the discontinuity around zero net worth, the results indicate that
hazard rates to employment decline with wealth. In view of the theoretical liter-
ature discussed in the introduction, this could be rationalized by a positive effect
of wealth on reservation wages and/or a negative effect on search effort. As in the
previous section, it is unlikely that the net worth coefficients identify causal effect
as simultaneity is probably present. However, there is an important difference.
It is reasonable to think that wealth accumulation is, if anything, lower during
non-employment. If some unobserved factor causes individuals to stay out of em-
ployment for longer, it will likely imply that they have lower net worth. Omitting
relevant variables will then induce a positive bias in the relationship between net
worth and hazard rates, while the estimated relation is, in fact, negative. There-
fore even if the coefficients do not identify the causal effect, the latter is most
likely negative.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper explores the reduced-form relationship between wealth, re-employment
wages and hazard rates into employment, in the 1996 panel of the Survey of
Income and Program Participation. It complements the literature by studying a
new dataset. As in related previous studies I find that the relationship between net
worth and hazard rates is negative. This evidence is consistent with the theoretical
prediction of search models featuring risk-averse workers. In disagreement with
prior studies I show that net worth and wages are not monotonically related - in
fact, re-employment wages decline with net worth while the latter is negative (as
for about 20 percent of the sample) and then increase when positive, attaining a
minimum for workers around zero net worth. I argue that prior estimates are based
on inappropriate specification of the main relationship of interest. The pattern
is robust even after controlling for a broad range of observables but disappears
when accounting for past wages. This finding is inconsistent either with theoretical
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predictions or with the view that causal effects are identified by the approach used
here and in previous studies.
Causality aside, the fact than the most wealth-poor individuals are high-
earners raises interesting question on its own. Inspection of the data reveals
that the major difference between those at the left tail of the net worth distribu-
tion and the asset-rich is that the former are younger. Understanding the pattern
motivates a fusion of life-cycle and labour-market dimensions.
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Appendix
2.A Data quality
This section discusses some well-understood issues regarding the quality of income,
labour force status, and assets data in the SIPP. The discussion is largely based
on Czajka and Denmead (2008) and Czajka et al. (2003).
It is well-documented that major surveys underestimate aggregate earned in-
come of US households in comparison to data based on administrative records
and estimates based on the SIPP are lower than other surveys. This discrep-
ancy, however, can be largely attributed to sample selection (the SIPP surveys
disproportionately in regions with high concentration of poverty) and top-coding
of income (the SIPP estimates of average income at the top/bottom of the dis-
tribution are lowest/highest among major surveys). While this raises concerns
about income-data reliability, the differences among surveys are, in fact, small
(Czajka and Denmead, 2008).
With respect to labour-market status data a well-known problem in the SIPP
is seam bias. The survey reports a disproportionately large amount of transitions
occurring ”at the seam” between waves. It should be noted, however, that seam
bias is a problem in all surveys and given its relatively short reference period the
SIPP has a comparative advantage in this respect. In estimating hazard rates, I
include controls for the two weeks around the seam and attribute any significant
differences in comparison to the rest of the reference period to such bias.
In comparison to surveys that collect asset data (in particular SCF and PSID),
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the SIPP estimates substantially lower average and somewhat lower median house-
hold net worth. As compared to SCF both assets liabilities are underestimated.
19. As with income, however, most of the differences seem to be attributable
to sample selection and top-coding practices. The main empirical results in this
paper are based not on continuous measures of net worth but on categorical or-
dering of households by net worth, and as long as the categories are sufficiently
well identified results should not be sensitive to measurement error.
2.B Definition of wealth and debt variables
This section describes the wealth and debt variables used in the analysis and how
they were created from the variables available in the 1996 SIPP panel, waves 3,6,9,
and 12.
The SIPP collects asset and liabilities data for a number of categories at indi-
vidual level. In addition, it provides recode variables at household level that sum
the individual level assets and liabilities across all household members except for
those related to the value of property and vehicles. The latter are identical for
each household member and enter the household-level recodes only once through
the values reported by the household reference person. All the variables I use in
my analysis are based on these household-level recodes.
Household liquid wealth is defined as the sum of the interest rate earning
assets held in banks and other institutions, and equity in stocks and mutual funds
(thhintbk, thhintot, and rhhstk in the SIPP recodes). Pension wealth is defined as
the sum of equity in IRA and KEOGH accounts for all household members (thhira
in the SIPP recodes). Total business equity is based on the variable thhbeq ; net
equity in vehicles is based on thhvehcl ; other household wealth is defined as the
sum of net equity in real estate other than the household’s home (thhore), and
total other assets (thhotast).
19Czajka et al. (2003) report that the SIPP estimate of median assets is 83 percent of the
SCF estimate while the estimate of median liabilities is 97 percent of the SCF estimate.
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Net home equity is based on the home equity recode (thhtheq) which is identi-
cally equal to the sum of the current value of home property (tpropval), reported
value of mobile home (tmhval), net of the total debt owned on the former (thh-
mortg).
Total household wealth (thhtwlth) is the sum of all aforementioned asset cat-
egories. It should be noted that it already includes net rather than gross asset
positions with respect to value of the household’s home and vehicles.
Credit card debt is the sum of credit card debts owed in own name by all
individual household members (ealidab) plus the sum of all credit card debts
owed jointly by subsets of household members (ealjdab). Similarly household
debt on loans sums across household members their individual loans (ealidal)
and jointly owed loans (ealjdal). Finally, other household debt includes the sum
of all individual ”other” debts across household members (ealidao and ealjdao).
The loan debt includes the amount of money ”owed for loans obtained through a
bank or credit union, other than car loans or home equity loans”. ”Other” debt
includes money owed ”for any other debt not yet mentioned (include medical bills
not covered by insurance, money owed to private individuals, and any other debt
not covered; exclude mortgages, home equity loans and car loans)”. The sum of
household credit card debt, loan debt and other debt is identically equal to the
total household unsecured debt (rhhuscbt).
Throughout the paper I use two alternative definitions of net worth. The
benchmark definition uses the SIPP recode for total household net worth (thhtnw).
The latter is identically equal to the ”total household wealth” (thhtwlth) net of
total unsecured debt (rhhuscbt). Netting out only the unsecured debt is necessi-
tated by the fact that thhtwlth already subtracts the value of secured debt. Net
worth based on the first definition therefore includes all home related assets and
liabilities. In addition, I use a definition of net worth excluding households’ asset
positions in the housing market. The net worth net of the housing position is
identically equal to th total household net worth recode (thhtnw) minus the home
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equity (thhtheq). The latter is equal to the value of the household’s property
(tpropval) minus the value of the mortgage (thhmortg).
Table 2.B.1: Net worth categories, group sizes
SIPP Wages Hazards
Net worth Heads Spouses Heads Spouses Heads Spouses
NW1 ≤ −7769 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09
NW2 (−7769,−100] 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.08
NW3 (−100, 100] 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.01
NW4 (100, 1651] 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.05
NW5 (1651, 9887] 0.10 0.08 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.12
NW6 (9887, 25737] 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.12
NW7 (25737, 47415] 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.09
NW8 (47415, 74961] 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09
NW9 (74961, 114442] 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.09
NW10 (114442, 180752] 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.09
NW11 (180752, 336453] 0.10 0.12 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.08
NW12 ≥ 336453 0.10 0.13 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.10
Observations 84519 63529 4589 3355 7313 5942
Note: The final columns refer to the net worth at the time of transition/right-censoring.
For comparability between the different estimation exercises I define the net
worth categories based on the distribution of net worth for the households in the
whole survey. Under both definitions households with net worth between -100
and 100 constitute the third category.
2.B.1 Net worth including home equity
In the pooled asset data, households with net worth between -100 and 100 dollars
(deflated) are located between the 12th and 15.8th percentiles of the net worth
distribution. I assign these households to the third net worth category. The first
two categories are the two equally large groups of households with lower net worth.
The fourth category complements the third up to the 20th percentile. All the next
categories correspond to a decile of the net worth distribution. Even in the overall
data from the survey the twelve categories are not of equal size. Further when
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constructing the samples for each of the empirical exercises, the sizes of the groups
change. Table 2.B.1 reports the sizes of these groups for all of the constructed
samples.
2.B.2 Net worth without home equity
In the pooled asset data, households with net worth between -100 and 100 dollars
(deflated) are located between the 19.5th and 24.6th percentiles of the net worth
distribution. With home equity subtracted from the total net worth the individ-
uals with zero wealth are shifted towards the right in the distribution. I choose
to assign these to the third net worth category and as a result there are eleven
rather than twelve categories. Table 2.B.2 reports the sizes of these groups for all
constructed samples.
Table 2.B.2: Net worth categories, no home equity, group sizes
SIPP Wages Hazards
Net worth Heads Spouses Heads Spouses Heads Spouses
NW1 ≤ −6040 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.13
NW2 (−6040,−100] 0.10 0.08 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.12
NW3 (−100, 100] 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.09 0.02
NW4 (100, 1222] 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.05
NW5 (1222, 4827] 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.10
NW6 (4827, 9706] 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.10
NW7 (9706, 17891] 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10
NW8 (17891, 36771] 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.09
NW9 (36771, 82401] 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.09
NW10 (82401, 209829] 0.10 0.12 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.09
NW11 ≥ 209829 0.10 0.13 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.10
Observations 84519 63529 4589 3355 7313 5942
Note: The final columns refer to the net worth at the time of transition/right-censoring.
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2.C Modelling duration dependence
To account for duration dependence in (2.4) I generate 26 indicator variables
taking a value of 1 if the current length of a spell for a particular observation falls
within some interval and 0 otherwise. Since the aggregate hazard rates declines
at a decreasing rate I give higher weight to the first weeks of a spell. Table 2.C.1
presents the indicators created and the corresponding intervals of elapsed time in
weeks.
Table 2.C.1: Duration dependence
Indicator Duration (weeks)
1-15 1-15
16 (15, 17]
17 (17, 19]
18 (19, 21]
19 (21, 23]
20 (23, 25]
21 (25, 29]
22 (29, 33]
23 (33, 37]
24 (37, 45]
25 (45, 55]
26 (55,∞]
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Table 2.D.1: Wage regression, household heads
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NW1 0.420∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗ 0.128∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.041)
NW2 0.225∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.0683 0.0386
(0.000) (0.001) (0.200) (0.477)
NW3 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
NW4 0.144∗∗ 0.103∗∗ 0.0576 0.0316
(0.002) (0.006) (0.157) (0.449)
NW5 0.266∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗ 0.0978∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.038)
NW6 0.333∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗ 0.125∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.016)
NW7 0.376∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
NW8 0.445∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NW9 0.498∗∗∗ 0.418∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗ 0.188∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.025)
NW10 0.666∗∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NW11 0.579∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
NW12 0.764∗∗∗ 0.712∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
State X X X X
Metro area 0.144∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗ 0.105∗∗
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
Num. persons -0.0119 0.00306 0.00381
(0.277) (0.732) (0.708)
Any children -0.0369 -0.0202 -0.0186
(0.131) (0.424) (0.468)
Age 0.0458∗∗∗ 0.0338∗∗∗ 0.0329∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age2 -0.0006∗∗∗ -0.0005∗∗∗ -0.0005∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.335∗∗∗ -0.310∗∗∗ -0.281∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married 0.1269∗∗∗ 0.0850∗∗∗ 0.0821∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.007) (0.009)
Observations 4589 4589 4437 4437
p-values in parentheses
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Race
Black 0.0497 0.0405 0.0501
(0.102) (0.211) (0.143)
Native American 0.0374 0.0716 0.0754
(0.669) (0.413) (0.389)
Asian 0.0208 0.00460 0.0140
(0.550) (0.915) (0.740)
Education
< High school 0.126∗∗ 0.133∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
High school 0.178∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
< Degree 0.257∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Undergraduate 0.536∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Master’s 0.746∗∗∗ 0.749∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
PhD 0.113 0.125
(0.795) (0.773)
Professional 0.863∗∗∗ 0.862∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Enrolled -0.0291 -0.0283
(0.531) (0.524)
Experience, years 0.0101∗ 0.00624
(0.016) (0.149)
Experience2 -0.0000546 -0.0000121
(0.553) (0.898)
Spell, wks -0.00867∗
(0.015)
Spell2 0.0000738
(0.344)
UI income 0.000143∗∗∗
(0.000)
Business income 0.0000933
(0.345)
Other income 0.0000120
(0.476)
HH income (net) 0.00000384
(0.461)
Work hrs 0.00101
(0.291)
Constant 1.707∗∗∗ 0.957∗∗∗ 0.973∗∗∗ 1.034∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 4589 4589 4437 4437
p-values in parentheses
62
Table 2.D.2: Wage regression, spouses
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NW1 0.278∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ 0.187∗ 0.175∗
(0.002) (0.000) (0.025) (0.032)
NW2 0.220∗ 0.243∗∗ 0.179∗ 0.169∗
(0.011) (0.003) (0.026) (0.032)
NW3 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
NW4 0.0730 0.103 0.0252 0.0214
(0.454) (0.264) (0.793) (0.822)
NW5 0.219∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.177∗ 0.172∗
(0.008) (0.000) (0.025) (0.026)
NW6 0.282∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗ 0.204∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.006) (0.011)
NW7 0.359∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NW8 0.368∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NW9 0.381∗∗∗ 0.524∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
NW10 0.523∗∗∗ 0.650∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NW11 0.476∗∗∗ 0.624∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NW12 0.667∗∗∗ 0.765∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗∗ 0.454∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
State X X X X
Metro area 0.120∗∗∗ 0.0769∗ 0.0765∗
(0.005) (0.047) (0.048)
Num. persons -0.0546∗∗∗ -0.0299∗ -0.0311∗
(0.000) (0.007) (0.008)
Any children 0.0607 0.0435 0.0573
(0.085) (0.171) (0.084)
Age 0.0256∗∗∗ 0.000490 -0.000441
(0.000) (0.953) (0.958)
Age2 -0.0004∗∗∗ -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.000) (0.306) (0.405)
Female -0.369∗∗∗ -0.347∗∗∗ -0.336∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Race
Black 0.0416 0.0578 0.0582
(0.377) (0.208) (0.190)
Native American 0.135 0.134 0.134
(0.175) (0.095) (0.077)
Asian -0.0149 -0.00919 -0.00468
(0.842) (0.892) (0.947)
Observations 3355 3355 3045 3045
p-values in parentheses
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Education
< High school -0.0487 -0.0582
(0.300) (0.191)
High school 0.0679 0.0584
(0.155) (0.183)
< Degree 0.107∗∗ 0.0937∗∗
(0.004) (0.006)
Undergraduate 0.374∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Master’s 0.447∗∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
PhD 0.649∗∗∗ 0.649∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Professional 0.880∗∗∗ 0.841∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Enrolled -0.00802 -0.0113
(0.924) (0.889)
Experience, years 0.0160∗∗∗ 0.0128∗∗
(0.001) (0.006)
Experience2 -0.000239∗ -0.000188
(0.014) (0.053)
Spell, wks -0.00556∗
(0.041)
Spell2 0.0000297
(0.655)
UI income 0.000129∗
(0.027)
Business income 0.0000136∗∗∗
(0.000)
Other income -0.000000
(0.988)
HH income (net) 0.0000103∗
(0.044)
Work hrs 0.000238
(0.878)
Constant 1.695∗∗∗ 1.590∗∗∗ 1.894∗∗∗ 1.960∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 3355 3355 3045 3045
p-values in parentheses
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Table 2.D.3: Wage regression, married heads
Net worth (1) (2) (3) (4)
NW1 0.426∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗ 0.168∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.021)
NW2 0.258∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.112 0.0927
(0.000) (0.001) (0.123) (0.206)
NW3 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
NW4 0.160∗ 0.149 0.0695 0.0481
(0.032) (0.058) (0.363) (0.535)
NW5 0.286∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.173∗ 0.146∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.033)
NW6 0.327∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗ 0.173∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.016)
NW7 0.349∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗ 0.176∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.017)
NW8 0.468∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
NW9 0.526∗∗∗ 0.540∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NW10 0.663∗∗∗ 0.669∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NW11 0.542∗∗∗ 0.602∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
NW12 0.763∗∗∗ 0.835∗∗∗ 0.516∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 3045 3045 2952 2952
p-values in parentheses
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Table 2.D.5: Wage regression, no home equity, heads
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NW1 0.429∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
NW2 0.274∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.103∗ 0.0716
(0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.091)
NW3 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
NW4 0.139∗∗ 0.0948∗ 0.0558 0.0348
(0.002) (0.029) (0.199) (0.424)
NW5 0.230∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.0870∗ 0.0594
(0.000) (0.000) (0.034) (0.149)
NW6 0.358∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
NW7 0.379∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.006)
NW8 0.498∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
NW9 0.615∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NW10 0.642∗∗∗ 0.538∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NW11 0.710∗∗∗ 0.622∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 4589 4589 4437 4437
p-values in parentheses
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Table 2.D.6: Wage regression, no home equity, spouses
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NW1 0.269∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 0.139 0.119
(0.001) (0.000) (0.077) (0.125)
NW2 0.106 0.147 0.0757 0.0616
(0.173) (0.052) (0.323) (0.420)
NW3 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
NW4 -0.0200 0.00581 -0.0657 -0.0668
(0.825) (0.947) (0.473) (0.465)
NW5 0.189∗ 0.228∗∗ 0.124 0.112
(0.018) (0.002) (0.112) (0.151)
NW6 0.205∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.130 0.113
(0.008) (0.000) (0.089) (0.135)
NW7 0.231∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.140 0.121
(0.004) (0.000) (0.088) (0.140)
NW8 0.358∗∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗ 0.211∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.009)
NW9 0.368∗∗∗ 0.432∗∗∗ 0.216∗ 0.190∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.029)
NW10 0.406∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗ 0.231∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.007)
NW11 0.521∗∗∗ 0.583∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003)
Observations 3355 3355 3045 3045
p-values in parentheses
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Table 2.D.7: Wage regression, previous wage, household heads
(1) (2)
NW1 0.150∗∗ 0.0654
(0.009) (0.242)
NW2 0.0615 -0.00523
(0.267) (0.924)
NW4 0.00814 -0.0269
(0.885) (0.621)
NW5 0.113∗ 0.0456
(0.021) (0.342)
NW6 0.107∗ 0.0239
(0.037) (0.633)
NW7 0.144∗ 0.0556
(0.012) (0.324)
NW8 0.250∗∗∗ 0.048
(0.000) (0.110)
NW9 0.196∗∗ 0.0677
(0.004) (0.309)
NW10 0.388∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
NW11 0.304∗∗∗ 0.171∗
(0.000) (0.015)
NW12 0.420∗∗∗ 0.215∗
(0.000) (0.014)
log(Wt−) 0.299
∗∗∗
(0.000)
Observations 2771 2771
Regressions include constant and controls for age, sex,
education and marital status
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Table 2.D.8: C-log-log regression, household heads
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NW1 0.632∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗ 0.608∗∗∗ 0.510∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NW2 0.407∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
NW3 0.139 -0.0000 0.223∗ 0.0861
(0.114) (1.000) (0.028) (0.411)
NW4 0.527∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗ 0.552∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NW5 0.391∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.002)
NW6 0.439∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
NW7 0.432∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NW8 0.289∗∗∗ 0.192∗ 0.282∗∗ 0.204∗
(0.001) (0.031) (0.002) (0.032)
NW9 0.255∗∗ 0.182∗ 0.258∗∗ 0.201∗
(0.005) (0.046) (0.006) (0.036)
NW10 0.209∗ 0.160 0.223∗ 0.179
(0.025) (0.090) (0.021) (0.069)
NW11 0.200∗ 0.166 0.181 0.145
(0.030) (0.072) (0.055) (0.130)
NW12 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Metro -0.0108 -0.0312 -0.0104
(0.765) (0.396) (0.778)
Number of persons -0.0601∗∗∗ -0.0396∗∗ -0.0324∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.009)
Age 0.0130 -0.0410∗∗∗ -0.0360∗∗
(0.071) (0.000) (0.001)
Age2 -0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0003 0.0002
(0.000) (0.065) (0.137)
Female -0.666∗∗∗ -0.631∗∗∗ -0.620∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married -0.142∗∗ -0.193∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.000) (0.001)
Enrolled 0.185∗ 0.133 0.145
(0.015) (0.085) (0.061)
Race
Black -0.0116 -0.0246 -0.0493
(0.790) (0.581) (0.270)
Native American -0.132 -0.0550 -0.0634
(0.220) (0.613) (0.560)
Asian -0.0333 -0.0345 -0.0514
(0.705) (0.698) (0.565)
Observations 152147 152147 148712 148712
p-values in parentheses
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Education
< High school -0.119 -0.108
(0.163) (0.210)
High school -0.0156 0.0070
(0.849) (0.932)
< Degree 0.122 0.154
(0.140) (0.062)
Undergraduate 0.200∗ 0.260∗∗
(0.029) (0.005)
Masters 0.247∗ 0.330∗∗
(0.031) (0.004)
PhD 0.0122 0.0923
(0.958) (0.692)
Professional 0.279 0.320
(0.111) (0.069)
Experience, years 0.0358∗∗∗ 0.0382∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Experience2 -0.0005∗∗∗ -0.0006∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
UI income -0.0004∗∗∗
(0.000)
Business income 0.0002∗∗∗
(0.000)
Other income -0.0001∗
(0.039)
HH income (net) -0.0001∗∗∗
(0.000)
Constant -3.276∗∗∗ -2.681∗∗∗ -2.160∗∗∗ -2.144∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 152147 152147 148712 148712
p-values in parentheses
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Table 2.D.9: C-log-log regression, spouses
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NW1 0.411∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
NW2 0.480∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NW3 0.503∗∗∗ 0.231 0.509∗∗ 0.411∗∗
(0.000) (0.118) (0.001) (0.010)
NW4 0.334∗∗∗ 0.141 0.231∗ 0.135
(0.000) (0.146) (0.030) (0.209)
NW5 0.290∗∗∗ 0.166∗ 0.263∗∗ 0.176∗
(0.000) (0.036) (0.002) (0.045)
NW6 0.191∗ 0.0829 0.150 0.0699
(0.013) (0.296) (0.078) (0.417)
NW7 0.163∗ 0.0755 0.147 0.0741
(0.042) (0.355) (0.093) (0.401)
NW8 0.172∗ 0.0827 0.126 0.0660
(0.033) (0.313) (0.144) (0.447)
NW9 0.155 0.109 0.139 0.0901
(0.056) (0.184) (0.103) (0.297)
NW10 0.0294 -0.0038 0.0499 -0.0011
(0.727) (0.964) (0.564) (0.990)
NW11 0.0680 0.0392 0.0359 0.0067
(0.427) (0.647) (0.685) (0.940)
NW12 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Metro -0.0517 -0.0807 -0.0650
(0.200) (0.057) (0.126)
Num. persons -0.0570∗∗∗ -0.0342∗ -0.0311∗
(0.000) (0.017) (0.030)
Age 0.0112 -0.0321∗∗ -0.0268∗
(0.201) (0.007) (0.024)
Age2 -0.0002∗ 0.0002 0.0002
(0.017) (0.083) (0.180)
Female -0.751∗∗∗ -0.711∗∗∗ -0.690∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Enrolled 0.205∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.001) (0.000)
Race
Black -0.0756 -0.0579 -0.0629
(0.286) (0.438) (0.398)
Native American 0.166 0.185 0.170
(0.193) (0.155) (0.190)
Asian -0.0287 -0.0244 -0.0442
(0.756) (0.803) (0.653)
Observations 172477 172477 162502 162502
p-values in parentheses
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Education
< High school -0.143 -0.123
(0.169) (0.237)
High school -0.108 -0.0866
(0.267) (0.371)
< Degree -0.0750 -0.0397
(0.443) (0.685)
Undergraduate -0.0861 -0.0277
(0.410) (0.792)
Masters 0.121 0.173
(0.345) (0.178)
PhD 0.0678 0.169
(0.776) (0.483)
Professional -0.0612 -0.0346
(0.794) (0.886)
Experience, years 0.0389∗∗∗ 0.0396∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Experience2 -0.0007∗∗∗ -0.0007∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
UI income -0.0002∗
(0.016)
Business income 0.0002∗∗∗
(0.000)
Other income -0.0000
(0.112)
HH income (net) -0.0001∗∗∗
(0.000)
Constant -3.482∗∗∗ -2.657∗∗∗ -2.258∗∗∗ -2.282∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 172477 172477 162502 162502
p-values in parentheses
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Table 2.D.10: C-log-log, no home equity, heads
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NW1 0.620∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗ 0.590∗∗∗ 0.496∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NW2 0.391∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗ 0.412∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
NW3 0.165 0.00317 0.229∗ 0.0925
(0.055) (0.973) (0.020) (0.365)
NW4 0.477∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗ 0.508∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NW5 0.444∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NW6 0.416∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
NW7 0.367∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.004)
NW8 0.391∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
NW9 0.228∗ 0.153 0.199∗ 0.154
(0.012) (0.095) (0.034) (0.106)
NW10 0.303∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗ 0.304∗∗ 0.276∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
NW11 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Observations 152147 152147 148712 148712
p-values in parentheses
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Table 2.D.11: C-log-log, no home equity, spouses
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NW1 0.314∗∗∗ 0.148∗ 0.167∗ 0.0828
(0.000) (0.048) (0.037) (0.305)
NW2 0.285∗∗∗ 0.123 0.184∗ 0.0931
(0.000) (0.112) (0.028) (0.272)
NW3 0.226 -0.0275 0.126 0.0141
(0.077) (0.834) (0.372) (0.921)
NW4 0.155 -0.0359 -0.00314 -0.112
(0.090) (0.702) (0.976) (0.283)
NW5 0.158∗ 0.0126 0.0632 -0.0368
(0.038) (0.873) (0.460) (0.672)
NW6 0.125 -0.00795 0.0492 -0.0362
(0.109) (0.922) (0.566) (0.676)
NW7 0.0754 -0.0311 0.0296 -0.0465
(0.342) (0.700) (0.728) (0.589)
NW8 0.0732 -0.00162 0.0147 -0.0520
(0.359) (0.984) (0.862) (0.542)
NW9 0.0782 -0.00961 0.0186 -0.0281
(0.327) (0.905) (0.824) (0.738)
NW10 -0.0413 -0.0718 -0.0637 -0.0960
(0.619) (0.387) (0.458) (0.266)
NW11 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Observations 172477 172477 162502 162502
p-values in parentheses
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Chapter 3
Labour market frictions,
endogenous retirement, and
wealth
3.1 Introduction
Respondents to household surveys identify financing consumption after retirement
and insurance against unexpected events as the two most important reasons for
saving1. While theoretical models emphasising precautionary motives have proved
successful in replicating broad trends in empirical wealth distributions, direct evi-
dence shows that precautionary wealth is too small a proportion of total wealth2.
Long-term life-cycle motives should instead be the dominant force behind central
tendencies of the wealth distribution.
Canonical versions of the life-cycle model3 take a household’s earning process
1For example, see Cagetti (2003) and Schunk (2009) for descriptive statistics on self-reported
saving motives.
2Fulford (2015) shows that the median household in the SCF reports to need a little more
than a month’s income in savings for ”emergencies and other unexpected things that may come
up”. Hurst et al. (2010) finds that precautionary savings account for less than 10 percent of
total household wealth in the PSID, and attribute previous higher estimates (e.g. Carroll and
Samwick (1997)) to pooling together business owners and other household - two groups that
otherwise hold the same low ratio of precautionary to total wealth. This is in line with earlier
studies such as Lusardi (1998) and Guiso et al. (1992).
3For example, Hubbard et al. (1994a) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002).
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and retirement age as exogenous. In fact, earnings are determined by individual
labour market experiences and a large literature studying the interaction between
labour market decisions and life-cycle phenomena has emerged. Moreover, the as-
sumption that workers retire at the same age conceals considerable heterogeneity.
In the US, labour-force participation declines steadily after the age of 55 (with
discontinuous falls around the Social Security early and full retirement ages) but
about 20 percent of 70-75 year-olds (12 percent of 75-80 year-olds) are still partic-
ipants4. Retirement is a decision rather than an exogenous feature of the environ-
ment. Burbidge and Robb (1980) proposed a modification of the pure life-cycle
model where households choose efficiently when to retire in order to maximise
lifetime utility from consumption and leisure. Versions of this model have been
used extensively to study optimal retirement age5. It should be noted that in this
tradition labour markets are not modelled explicitly and agents are assumed to
follow a sequence of employment and non-participation (retirement) for exogenous
reasons.
It has been documented that certain groups of the population (e.g. the poor)
save significantly less than implied by plain life-cycle models 6. Various explana-
tions have been proposed, including ones rooted in behavioural economics7. But
when retirement is a decision, a rational household’s optimal saving policy should
be consistent with its plan about when to retire - a logic somewhat explicit in
4These are the figures from the 2012 CPS as reported by Toossi (2013).
5Recent studies include Bloom et al. (2007, 2014), D’Albis et al. (2012) and Kuhn et al.
(2015) who investigate optimal retirement in the context of demographic changes, increases in
longevity or expenditure on healthcare.
6For example, in an influential study, Dynan et al. (2004), using alternative strategies for
isolating permanent earnings, documented that saving rates are increasing with measures of
permanent earnings consistently across specifications in three different US surveys (PSID, SCF
and CEX). Hubbard et al. (1994b) use PSID to show that a significant fraction of households
with low lifetime earnings have pre-retirement wealth accumulation too small to be consistent
with the perfect-market version of the life-cycle model. They further show that asset-poor
households have inconsistently low saving rates, to the extent that low wealth is an ”absorbing
state over lengthy periods of time”.
7Examples of rational explanations include persistent differences in time preference rates
or subsistence parameters (Dynan et al., 2004); differences in Social Security replacement rates
across high and low earning households (Huggett and Ventura, 2000); consumers deriving utility
directly from wealth (Carroll, 2000), among others. For examples of behavioural explanations
see (Laibson et al., 1998), Bernheim et al. (2001) and Benartzi and Thaler (2013), among others.
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defined contribution plans where workers choose saving rates. If expected time
of retirement varies with expected long-term earnings8, then so will saving be-
haviour. For example, the poor might save little because they intend to work
until older ages. If leisure is a normal good then its pursuit at older ages might
be prohibitively costly for some.
This paper presents a model of a frictional labour market where risk-averse
workers enjoy leisure when non-participants and earn a wage when employed but
transit from non-participation into employment only through a spell of frictional
unemployment. Labour is indivisible. Workers are characterised by time-invariant
productivity which maps into a wage rate and differ by initial wealth endowments.
When sufficiently asset-poor, workers of any productivity plan to work indefi-
nitely. Efficient retirement plans along the lines of Burbidge and Robb (1980)
arise endogenously from more asset-rich employed worker’s decisions and optimal
labour-market and consumption/saving policies are consistent with the retirement
plan. Sufficiently asset-rich workers never work, enjoy leisure and consume out of
interest income.
The model combines the main abstraction of the life-cycle hypothesis with
endogenous retirement choice and emphasises how the latter emerges as a result
of optimal behaviour when labour markets are frictional. It, hence, presents a
framework for analysing the relationship between labour-market behaviour, asset
accumulation and retirement strategies. A closely related paper by Rogerson and
Wallenius (2013) discusses the role of non-convexities in the worker’s problem,
and labour indivisibility in particular, for generating abrupt transitions from em-
ployment to non-participation9. Our analysis also relies on a non-convexity due to
8Two empirical observations seem robust across countries and specifications. First, house-
hold wealth is positively related to the probability of retirement at any age. For example,
Imbens et al. (2001) show that large lottery gains lead to significant reduction of labour supply,
particularly for those around retirement; Brown et al. (2010) finds that receipt of inheritance
increases probability of retirement especially when inheritance is unexpected. Second, descrip-
tive evidence (Kallestrup-Lamb et al., 2016; Bender et al., 2014) suggests that controlling for
wealth, individual earnings are inversely related to the probability of retirement - an observa-
tion suggestive of opposing income and substitution effects of earned income on consumption of
leisure over the life cycle.
9In addition to labour indivisibility, they suggest two different sources of non-convexity -
79
labour indivisibility, but as the latter results from frictions it further implies that
workers specialise in work early in life and in leisure later. When labour markets
are frictional quits to non-participation are suboptimal if an individual intends to
return to employment later. Our theoretical environment is also similar to the one
in Krusell et al. (2008) but we focus on the implications of labour indivisibility
for wealth accumulation while they study the flows between labour market states.
The environment abstracts from a number of features customarily present in
life-cycle models, including income and mortality risk, health and expenditure
shocks, and intergenerational transfers. As a result, the analysis abstracts from
precautionary and bequest motives, while permanent income and consumption-
leisure choice are emphasised as main motives for saving behaviour. This is in line
with the earlier discussion of the empirical magnitude of precautionary wealth.
One implication for the analysis is that the implied consumption profiles are flat
and consumption inequality is age independent (see Storesletten et al. (2005)). As
a result the model delivers highly tractable empirical predictions about the evo-
lution of wealth distributions in the presence of persistent differentials in earning
ability. We employ the 1996 and 2001 panels of the Survey of Income and Program
Participation to explore some empirical aspects of the latter. First, we estimate
non-parametrically the observed age profiles of the conditional on earnings net
worth distributions. We document that wealth gets increasingly dispersed with
earnings. The dispersion increases with age and is driven by pronounced length-
ening of the right tail of wealth while the bottom quantiles vary little with age.
The tenth percentile of wealth increases with age only for households with high
observed earnings. We argue that these observations are readily interpretable
through the prism of the model. Next we turn to individual households’ observed
saving outcomes. In the absence of uncertainty the model emphasises the role
of persistent differences in earning ability on optimal saving policies. To frame
empirical results more closely to the theoretical context we construct permanent
non-linearity of wages with respect to hours worked (to which they attribute the retirement
decision in French (2005)) and fixed time and consumption costs
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earnings proxies and investigate how permanent earnings and wealth map empir-
ically into median household saving outcomes. In order to limit the influence of
extreme observations we follow a double stage least absolute deviations estimation
(as proposed by Amemiya (1982)).The evidence is suggestive of the model’s em-
pirical adequacy in aspects where its implications differ from traditional life-cycle
models.
As documented in Section 3.5.310, while households with low earnings have low
net worth on average, households at the left tail of the net worth distribution have
high earnings, high levels of education, and are younger than their counterparts
in the right tail. In an application of the model we demonstrate how such pattern
could emerge as a result of education choice early in life. In particular, we ask
how initial endowments of wealth and abilities (productivities prior to obtaining
education) relate to the optimality of investing in costly education, given that
subsequent behaviour is as in the model. The analysis implies that, given wealth,
investment is only optimal for workers of sufficiently high ability; given ability, it
is only optimal for workers with sufficiently low wealth. These imply that wealth
dynamics induced by costly education early in life provides an explanation for the
observed pattern.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 presents the model
and formulates the optimal consumption/saving and labour-market strategies for
workers of given earning ability. Section 3.3 analyses how optimal policies differs
across workers with different productivity. Section 3.4 extends the framework by
introducing an education choice at the beginning of life and tracks the implica-
tions for early-age wealth dynamics. Section 3.5 presents some empirical results.
Section 3.6 concludes.
10See Chapter 2 of this thesis for a similar result obtained using a different dataset.
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3.2 Model
3.2.1 Environment
Time is continuous. An infinitely-lived11 risk-averse worker has productivity w
and wealth A. Labour is indivisible. The worker borrows and lends at a constant
risk-free rate, r, and derives utility from consumption and leisure. Preferences are
additively separable with flow utility from consumption, u(c), such that u′(.) > 0,
u′′(.) < 0, limc→0 u′(c) =∞ and flow utility, ub, from leisure.
At any point in time the worker is in one of three labour-market states -
non-participant, job-searcher or employed. The labour market is frictional as
she becomes employed only upon accepting a job offer. When employed she
earns w and decides whether to remain employed or quit into non-participation or
unemployment. When non-participant she earns no income, enjoys ub, and decides
whether to remain non-participant or transit to unemployment. When searching
she earns unemployment income, b < w, enjoys no leisure, samples job offers at
Poisson rate λ, and decides to remain unemployed or transit to non-participation.
For simplicity, assume she faces no layoff risk while employed.
An important assumption is that earned wage, w, is time-invariant12. While
the analysis generalises to i.i.d. income uncertainty the focus on long-term earn-
ing ability is consistent with an emphasis on life-cycle rather than precautionary
saving motives. Finally, given flat earning profiles, assume that the rate of time
preference equals the real interest rate, implying a taste for flat consumption
profiles as well.
Given this environment we now turn attention to workers’ optimisation prob-
lem.
11The environment generalises to exogenous Poisson death process but this brings no extra
insight.
12A constant growth rate in w generates convex regions in the value function for employ-
ment, inducing agents to pursue strategies that convexify their payoffs (for example, lotteries) -
behaviour from which we abstract.
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3.2.2 Optimisation problem
Let V np(A,w), V js(A,w) and V e(A,w) be the lifetime utilities from non-participation,
job search and employment, and V jA(.) ≡ ∂V j(.)/∂A in state j. Further, let
V n(A,w) ≡ max{V np(A,w), V js(A,w)} denote lifetime utility from non-employment.
The values from working or not given {A,w} are described by the system of Bell-
man equations (see Appendix 3.A.1)
rV n(A,w) = max

maxc≥0[u(c) + ub + V nA (A,w)(rA− c)]
maxc≥0[u(c) + V nA (A,w)(rA+ b− c)+
λmax(V e(A,w)− V n(A,w), 0)]

(3.1)
rV e(A,w) = max

maxc≥0[u(c) + V eA(A,w)(rA+ w − c)]
rV n(A,w)
 (3.2)
These summarise the discussion of labour-market states and optimal behaviour
as stated in Section 3.2.1. It is immediate that in any state optimal consumption
requires that the marginal utility of consumption equals the marginal value of the
asset13
u′(ci(A,w)) = V iA(A,w),∀i ∈ {np, js, e} (3.3)
Consider an employed worker. Using the (3.3) and (3.2), her discounted life-
time utility is
rV e(A,w) = u(ce(A,w)) + u′(ce(A,w))(rA+ w − ce(A,w)) (3.4)
13Without ad-hoc constraints on borrowing a worker will not face liquidity constraints as
long as rA+ b > 0. The equality counterpart to the latter identifies the natural borrowing limit.
83
Assuming differentiability, total differentiation of (3.4) with respect to time im-
plies
u′′(ce(A,w))ceA(A,w)(rA+ w − ce(A,w))2 = 0 (3.5)
Following the same argument for non-participating workers, optimal consump-
tion and wealth dynamics requires
u′′(ci(A,w))ciA(A,w)A˙
2 = 0, i ∈ {np, e} (3.6)
where x˙ ≡ ∂x/∂t. Workers attain perfect consumption smoothing within each
spell of employment or non-participation. There are two types of strategies con-
sistent with (3.6). One possibility is that a worker consumes all her income at
every instant (ce = rA + w or cnp = rA). If ever optimal, this is optimal forever
- wealth remains constant and the worker solves the same problem in every fu-
ture state. Alternatively, a worker could follow a flat consumption path over the
duration of a spell and accumulate/decumulate assets until changing employment
state. No other strategies could be optimal according to (3.6).
Inspection of (3.1) reveals that perfect consumption smoothing is not optimal
for unemployed workers. We postpone the discussion of their optimal strategies
until Section 3.2.4 and first characterise the behaviour of the employed.
3.2.3 Optimal behaviour of employed
Given (3.6) one potentially optimal strategy for an employed worker is to work
forever and consume all income in perpetuity. Similarly a potentially optimal
strategy for a non-participant is to never seek employment but enjoy leisure and
consume asset income forever - that is retire permanently. Notice that in both
cases a worker consumes her permanent income.
Other potentially optimal strategies involve asset accumulation/decumulation
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and switches between employment, non-participation and unemployment14. Quits
into non-participation allow the worker to enjoy leisure immediately; if planning
to become employed again, however, she will experience a spell of frictional un-
employment. The tension is resolved by a third possible strategy - she works and
saves in order to accumulate sufficient wealth to retire in future. Formally, con-
sider three possibly optimal labor-market strategies for an employed worker given
{A,w}:
Strategy 1: (Work forever) Work and consume permanent income, c(A,w) =
rA+w. If ever optimal, this is optimal forever. The associated lifetime payoff
is ΠE(A,w) = u(rA+ w)/r.
Strategy 2: (Permanently retire) Never participate and consume permanent
income, c(A,w) = rA. If ever optimal, this is optimal forever. The associ-
ated lifetime payoff is ΠR(A,w) = (u(rA) + ub)/r.
Strategy 3: (Optimal retirement plan) Work, consume permanent income15
c(A,w) < rA + w and save. Once a threshold amount of wealth, AR(w),
is accumulated, retire permanently and consume c(A,w) = rAR(w) forever
after.
The rest of this section demonstrates that given any initial {A,w} one and only one
of these strategies is optimal. As a starting point, consider the optimal behaviour
of a worker pursuing Strategy 3.
3.2.3.1 Characterisation of the optimal retirement plan
By construction strategies 1 and 2 are consistent with optimal consumption dy-
namics described by (3.6). Consider a worker pursuing strategy 3. While employed
14It is easy to see that an employed worker never quits into unemployment. Suppose she
does. Then unemployment is preferred to both employment and non-participation. Then (3.1)
implies that the value from unemployment is identical to the value of employment at wage
b < w. Standard arguments imply that the value of employment is increasing in w which is a
contradiction.
15The discussion of what permanent income is when a worker chooses the span of working
life is postponed until Section 3.2.3.1.
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she saves. Then (3.6) requires that consumption is constant for the duration of the
employment spell. Let c∗(w) denote its optimal level. Once the worker accumu-
lates a stock of wealth AR(w) she retires and consumes rAR(w) forever. Optimal
consumption smoothing and separability between consumption and leisure imply
c∗(w) = rAR(w).
Let τ(A,AR) be the optimal time to retirement given current wealth and wealth
at retirement16. Solving the wealth accumulation equation A˙ = rA + w − rAR
forward from 0 to τ(A,AR) yields
τ∫
0
A˙
rA+ w − rARdt =
τ∫
0
dt
1
r
ln(rA+ w − rAR)
∣∣∣∣τ
0
= τ
τ(A,AR) =
1
r
ln
(
w
rA+ w − rAR
)
(3.7)
Time to retirement decreases with wealth. In the limit as A approaches AR,
τ approaches zero. As rA approaches w − rAR time to retirement approaches
infinity.
A worker earns labour income only in annuity until retirement. Given AR and
(3.7) the discounted value of future labour income is
w
τ(A,AR)∫
0
e−rtdt =
w
r
(
1− e−rτ(A,AR)
)
=
c∗(w)− rA
r
and after rearranging
c∗(w)
r
= A+ w
τ∫
0
e−rtdt (3.8)
16Time to retirement depends on w but the argument is suppressed for brevity here as well
as in the expressions for lifetime payoffs derived below.
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(3.8) reveals that when planning for retirement workers consume permanent in-
come. Given τ a worker behaves identically to a pure life-cycle consumer who
faces the same time to retirement exogenously and is subject to an exogenous
stream of earnings of the same present value.
The worker consumes c∗ in perpetuity and after time τ(A,AR) enjoys leisure
in perpetuity. Therefore her lifetime payoff is
u(c∗)
∫ ∞
0
e−rtdt+ ub
∫ ∞
τ(A,AR)
e−rtdt
Integrating and substituting (3.7), the payoff from pursuing strategy 3 in terms
of AR is
Π(A,AR) =
u(rAR)
r
+
rA+ w − rAR
rw
ub (3.9)
Maximizing (3.9) with respect to AR yields the familiar first-order condition for
optimal consumption-leisure choice:
u′(c∗) =
ub
w
(3.10)
The worker chooses AR (and, equivalently c∗) in order to equalise the marginal
rate of substitution of consumption for leisure to her earned income. At the
margin by delaying retirement for an instant she loses the opportunity to enjoy
an immediate flow of leisure, ub, but is able to gain an extra flow of income w
which increases her utility from consumption by wu′(c∗).
Consumption during saving for retirement is increasing in w/ub. All else equal,
workers with strong preference for leisure consume less and accumulate wealth
faster so they are able to enjoy leisure sooner in the future. Similarly high-wage
workers consume more during employment and the subsequent spell of retirement.
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Using (3.9) the payoff from strategy 3 in terms of the model parameters is
ΠP (A,w) =
u(c∗(w))
r
+
rA+ w − c∗(w)
rw
ub (3.11)
Let AE(w) ≡ (c∗−w)/r. If A < AE(w) strategy 3 is not feasible as A˙|A<AE = rA+
w− c∗ < 0, i.e. workers decumulate wealth if consuming c∗. Let A¯E(w) ≡ AR(w).
3.2.3.2 Optimal consumption during employment
While easy to see that strategies 1-3 are consistent with (3.6), they need not be
either optimal or the only optimal strategies. The next result demonstrates their
optimality among a set of solutions characterised by the following property (later
verified to be consistent with the prescribed optimal behaviour):
Property 1. Whenever it is optimal for an employed worker to quit into non-
employment, she retires permanently.
Assuming Property 1 allows us to temporarily disregard strategies involving
cycles between the three labour market states and implies the following result:
Proposition 1. Optimal consumption of employed workers and retire-
ment
Conditional on Property 1
(i) If A ≤ AE(w), an employed worker’s optimal strategy is to work forever and
consume permanent income. Her lifetime utility is V (A,w) = ΠE(A,w).
(ii) If A ∈ (AE(w), A¯E(w)), an employed worker’s optimal strategy is to save for
retirement and consume permanent income. Her lifetime utility is V (A,w) =
ΠP (A,w).
(iii) If A ≥ A¯E(w), the worker’s optimal strategy is to retire permanently and
consume permanent income. Her lifetime utility is V (A,w) = ΠR(A,w).
Proof. The result is proved directly. Suppose that V (A,w) as stated above solves
the workers’ Bellman equations. Under this conjecture optimal consumption is as
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Figure 3.2.1: Wealth and labor market strategies
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stated. Given this optimal consumption the choice of V (A,w) is consistent with
the Bellman equations. Workings are demonstrated in Appendix 3.A.2.
Sufficiently asset-poor workers have high value from earned income and do
not plan to retire. The asset-rich receive large interest income which can finance
consumption while they also enjoy leisure. Between the extreme cases workers
save for retirement. The payoff from optimally saving for retirement is linear in
wealth and identifies the convex envelope of the payoffs from working forever and
retiring (Figure 3.2.1). When labour is supplied indivisibly at the cost of foregone
leisure, saving for retirement convexifies the payoffs from the ”pure” actions of
work and retirement, allowing workers to achieve an optimal combination of leisure
and consumption over the life cycle.
3.2.4 Optimal behaviour of non-employed and solution
The validity of Proposition 1 relies on Property 1 which is a conjecture about the
behaviour of non-employed workers. To complete the solution we characterise the
latter and show that Property 1 is indeed a feature of the model. To keep a clear
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focus on wealth accumulation, the analysis of non-employed workers’ behaviour is
delegated to Appendix 3.A.3, and only the main results and intuitions are listed
here. Let S(A,w) ≡ bu′(cn(A,w))+λ(V e(A,w)−V n(A,w)). Since non-employed
workers can freely change state between unemployment and non-participation,
non-participation is preferred if and only if S(A,w) < ub, and as demonstrated
later S(.) is strictly decreasing in A. Optimal behaviour of non-employed workers
is then fully characterised by the following
Proposition 2. Optimal consumption of non-employed workers
Conditional on Property 1 two wealth levels AU < A¯U exist such that
(i) A non-employed worker with A ∈ [−b/r, AU ] seeks employment and dissaves.
Optimal consumption and savings dynamics is described by the system
V nA (A) = u
′(cn(A))
cnA(A) =
λ(u′(cn(A))− u′(ce(A))
u′′(cn(A))(rA+ b− cn(A))
with terminal conditions cn(−b/r) = 0 and V n(−b/r) = u(0)+λV e(−b/r)
r+λ
. This
regime ends at AU where S(AU) = ub.
(ii) A non-employed worker with A ∈ (AU , A¯U) is non-participant, consumes
cn(AU), and dissaves. This regime ends at A¯U where A¯U = cn(AU)/r.
(iii) A non-employed worker with A ≥ A¯U retires permanently, consumes rA,
and saves 0.
Proof. The validity of 2 follows by construction from the arguments in Appendix
3.A.3.
The main arguments behind the result are as follows. Non-employed workers
can freely change state between unemployment and non-participation. A worker
sufficiently close to the natural borrowing limit relies on unemployment income
and future employment prospects to prevent unsustainable debt accumulation,
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Figure 3.2.2: Phase diagram
−b/r0
w−b
A
 
 
dA/dt=0
dcn/dt=0
(c*−w)/r (c*−b)/r c*/r
c
*/r
c
c
n
The phase portrait only applies for A ∈ [−b/r,AU ).
hence optimally avoids leisure. For wealth levels between the borrowing limit and
AU , unemployment dominates non-participation. The tension between desire for
smooth consumption and constraint on borrowing implies a unique saddle path
solution characterised by a steady decline of consumption and dissaving (Figure
3.2.2). At wealth levels between AU and A¯U the worker postpones job-search,
pursues leisure and dissaves until unemployment dominates again. At sufficiently
high wealth, the perspective of an employment opportunity far into the future
is discounted sufficiently so that the worker specialises in enjoying leisure and
retires.
Figure 3.2.3 illustrates the dynamics of consumption and wealth for employed
and non-employed workers over the wealth distribution’s support. Unlike em-
ployed and non-participating workers, the unemployed do not attain perfect con-
sumption smoothing since they cannot insure against the risk of not finding a job.
As they approach the borrowing limit the probability of not finding employment
before accumulating unsustainable debt increases. As a result they limit the pace
of dissaving due to precautionary motives.
The next result completes the solution by affirming that the behaviour de-
scribed by Propositions 1 and 2 implies Property 1.
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Figure 3.2.3: Consumption
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Theorem 1. Bellman equations (3.1) and (3.2) imply:
(i) The value function for employed workers, V e(A,w), is as stated in Proposi-
tion 1.
(ii) The value function for non-employed workers, V n(A,w), is as stated in
Proposition 2.
(iii) Property 1 holds.
Proof. Appendix 3.A.4.
The model implies optimal labour-market behaviour with natural life-cycle
interpretation and endogenous retirement decision. As rigidities prevent workers
from continuously adjusting their labour supply, they achieve optimal consumption-
leisure tradeoffs over the life cycle. They choose to work early in life so that they
have sufficient assets to retire later. While valuing leisure, they avoid temporary
quits into non-participation as finding employment involves costly search. When
choosing consumption they simultaneously plan retirement and retire where the
marginal value of extra earned income just equals the value of leisure. Con-
sumption/saving decisions and retirement plans depend on wealth endowment
and long-term earning ability. In the limit, the most asset-poor workers of given
earning ability do not save.
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The analysis demonstrates that, qualitatively, endogenous retirement provides
an explanation for the well documented empirical fact of low wealth being an
”absorbing state” (Hubbard et al., 1994b), while not deviating fundamentally
from the main life-cycle abstractions. The next section turns attention to the
model’s implications for the relationship between long-term earnings and saving
behaviour.
3.3 Earnings heterogeneity
Within this framework, earnings have two opposing effects on retirement plans.
The income effect of higher earnings, as a wealth transfer, encourages pursuit of
leisure (earlier retirement). However, high earnings imply high opportunity cost of
leisure (by retiring early a worker forgoes more income and consumption) and the
substitution effect results in higher consumption and postponement of retirement.
To see how the two effects interact it is more convenient to work with the total
effect on consumption. Implicitly differentiating c∗(w) in (3.10) with respect to w
and rearranging
∂c∗(w)
∂w
w
c∗(w)
= − u
′(c∗)
u′′(c∗)c∗
(3.12)
which links the elasticity of consumption with respect to earnings depends on the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution/risk aversion properties of preferences. For
future references, let R(.) denote the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Recall
that A¯E(w) = c∗(w)/r identifies the upper bound of the wealth distribution for
employed workers of ability w, or equivalently their wealth at retirement. It is
strictly increasing in w with the rate of increase depending on the risk-aversion
properties of the utility function. AE(w) = (c∗(w) − w)/r identifies the lower
bound below which workers do not save. The relationship between AE and w could
be increasing, decreasing or non-monotonic, depending on preference parameters.
The range of wealth levels where workers save, A¯E − AE = w/r, is proportional
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to earnings.
Consider a set of workers facing the same time to retirement, τ¯ . By (3.7)
e−rτ¯ =
rA− c∗(w) + w
w
and after rearranging
A|τ=τ¯ = (1− e−rτ¯ )AE + e−rτ¯ A¯E
The locus of {A,w} pairs where workers face the same retirement horizon is a
weighted mean of the AE and A¯E loci. The weight equals the discount factor for
time τ¯ into the future. Figure 3.3.1 illustrates the latter by mapping the plane into
times to retirement for different values of the risk aversion coefficient, all assuming
isoelastic utility, u(c) = c1−ρ/(1 − ρ)17. The two effects cancel out exactly when
preferences for consumption are described by log-utility so that all workers with
zero wealth face the same time to retirement. As a result scaling up earnings
scales permanent income proportionally and homothetic saving policies obtain. If
instead R(c) > 1, time to retirement relates to earnings non-monotonically but
starts decreasing after a threshold. Above the threshold, higher earnings translate
to less than proportionate increases in permanent income as workers plan to retire
sooner. The opposite occurs when relative risk aversion is below unity.
More precisely, recall the accumulation equation for employed savers
A˙ = rA+ w − c∗(w) (3.13)
Consider a set of workers of different w optimally choosing to save the same
amount ¯˙A. Rearranging (3.13), these workers have stock of wealth
A|
A˙= ¯˙A
=
¯˙A
r
+ AE(w)
17Figures 3.3.2 and 3.3.1 are plotted for r = 0.05 and ub set to imply (somewhat arbitrarily)
that a worker with zero wealth earning 60000 per year retires in exactly 40 years. ρ stands for
the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
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This identifies an ”iso-saving” set for ¯˙A. It is geometrically represented in the
(A,w)-plane as a horizontal translation of the AE locus by distance ¯˙A/r. Figure
3.3.2 plots some iso-saving curves in the case of isoelastic utility for three bench-
mark values of the risk aversion coefficient. Consider ”active” saving rates out of
earned income, (w− c∗(w))/w. Differentiating with respect to w and rearranging
∂[(w − c∗)/w]
∂w
=
c∗(w)
w2
[
1− 1
R(c∗)
]
Active saving rates increase with earnings when R > 1 and are independent when
R = 1. Similarly for ”total” saving rates out of earned income, A˙/w,
∂(A˙/w)
∂w
=
r
w2
[(
1− 1
R(c∗)
)
AR − A
]
Total saving rates depend on risk aversion and on the distance between a worker’s
current wealth and their target retirement wealth.
To summarize the discussion, under endogenous retirement optimal saving
behaviour depends on retirement plans. The relationship between saving rates
and earnings depends on how workers substitute consumption for leisure. If the
income effect on leisure dominates, high earners retire earlier hence save more
than proportionately in comparison to low earners; the opposite occurs if the
substitution effect dominates. The model presents a highly tractable description
of wealth dynamics in the presence of heterogeneity in permanent earnings and
wealth, implying the following. Asset-poor workers accumulate wealth slowly and
remain in the left tail of the distribution for long time; the asset-rich accumulate
wealth quickly until retirement; the relationship between total saving and wealth
is linear. High earners retire with more assets and are found over a broader
support of wealth; they save more or less than proportionately in comparison to
low earners depending on the interaction between income and substitution effects
of earnings. The empirical relevance of these predictions is discussed in Section
3.5, while Section 3.4 turns attention to the optimal choice of education and its
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implications for the distribution of wealth and earnings.
3.4 Education choice
Investment in education allows individuals to expand their long-term earning
prospects early in life but involves significant costs that could largely affect sub-
sequent life-cycle outcomes. This section employs the above framework to explore
the optimality of educational investment when individuals also plan retirement
efficiently.
More concretely, suppose that at the beginning of time a worker with ability
w0 and wealth A0 can choose to invest in education or not
18. For simplicity
the choice is binary (interpreted as pursuit of a higher degree) and acquisition
is instantaneous. Education costs a fixed fee, k, and increases productivity. In
particular, suppose that a worker with ability w0 earns w0 without education and
w0(1 + e) with education. For tractability assume that following the decision the
worker becomes employed immediately, hence precautionary motives do not affect
the choice19.
Let V0(A0, w0) ≡ V e(A0, w0), V1(A0, w0) ≡ V e(A0−k, w0(1 + e)), c0(A0, w0) ≡
ce(A0, w0), c1(A0, w0) ≡ ce(A0−k, w0(1+e)), τ0(A0, w0) and τ1(A0, w0) denote the
lifetime payoffs, optimal consumptions and times to retirement to a worker with
{w0, A0} if investing (state 1) or not (state 0) in education. Given Proposition 1
and (3.7)
rV0(A0, w0) = u(c0(A0, w0)) + e
−rτ0(A0,w0)ub
rV1(A0, w0) = u(c1(A0, w0)) + e
−rτ1(A0,w0)ub
18As demonstrated later, postponing educational choice has no option value in this setting.
Even if the choice was available later in life, workers would still invest when young.
19This is a strong assumption but simplifies the analysis considerably, as it allows us to
abstract from the behaviour of unemployed workers near the natural borrowing limit and its
inductive implications over the whole support of wealth. Thus the analysis emphasises life-cycle
motives in isolation.
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Figure 3.4.1: Optimal labor market strategies conditional on education
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As the worker becomes employed immediately a degree is pursued if and only if
V1(A0, w0) ≥ V0(A0, w0). The decision maps ability and wealth endowment into a
productivity level and initial wealth for the consumption problem. Notice that the
endowment {w0, A0} pins down the optimal labour-market strategies conditional
on investing in education or not (see Figure 3.4.1).
A worker is indifferent to education if and only if
V e(A0, w0) = V
e(A0 − k, w0(1 + e)) (3.14)
or equivalently
u(c1(A0, w0))− u(c0(A0, w0)) = (eτ0(A0,w0) − eτ1(A0,w0))e−rub
that is if the gain in consumption (in utility terms) just equals the loss of utility
due to possibly delaying retirement. The set of abilities and wealth endowments
where indifference obtains is henceforth referred to as the ”education efficiency
frontier”. Appendix 3.B constructs the frontier by analysing the decision of a
worker based on her ex-ante (without education) and ex-post (with education)
labour market strategies but the main intuition and results are discussed here.
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At sufficiently low wealth, individuals work forever irrespective of educational
attainment. They only trade consumption possibilities and are always just willing
to substitute a unit of wealth for r extra units earnings. The benefit from educa-
tion is a perpetual stream of extra earnings. At the margin this is compared in
present value terms to the one off cost of education incurred at the time of the
decision. Workers of sufficiently high ability enjoy higher extra earnings because
education complements ability. This implies a threshold wealth-independent abil-
ity where education becomes optimal and gives rise to a flat region of the education
efficiency frontier.
Workers with larger wealth endowment save for retirement. They enjoy boosted
earnings only in annuity. The higher their wealth endowment, the sooner they
retire - higher earnings translate to lower increases in permanent income and con-
sumption. They willingly substitute a unit of wealth for r× (w0)/(rAR− rA) > r
extra earnings. The threshold ability where indifference obtains therefore increases
with the wealth endowment. In the limit, individuals sufficiently wealthy to retire
immediately both with and without education, have no value from obtaining a
degree - no one obtains education to retire immediately.
These arguments imply20 that the education efficiency frontier is a continu-
ous, (weakly) upward-sloping schedule in the (A0, w0)-plane (Figure 3.4.2). Given
any wealth endowment, investment is optimal only for workers of sufficiently high
ability; given ability investment is optimal only for sufficiently wealth-poor work-
ers. This further demonstrates that given the stationary nature of the decision
problem the assumption of educational investment being available only early in
life is without loss of generality - as they accumulate wealth during employment
workers of any ability lose value by postponing investment. Education is pursued
early in life as when wealth is low, retirement is far in the future, and higher
earnings result in larger increases in permanent income.
As a result high-earning workers start employment with less assets than low
20See Appendix 3.B for a more thorough treatment.
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Figure 3.4.2: Education efficiency frontier and optimal strategy
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earners with identical pre-education wealth endowment, who find educational in-
vestment unprofitable. To the extent that education is sufficiently expensive, it
is a reason for significant wealth decumulation early in life, for those who invest.
This implies that the left tail of the marginal wealth distribution is populated
not by the income poor, but by young educated high earners, as documented
empirically in Section 3.5.3.
3.5 Empirical analysis of wealth dynamics
While highly stylized the model combines the main abstraction of life-cycle theory
with the view of endogenous retirement, and suggests a tractable description of
wealth dynamics emphasising life-cycle motives and persistent differences in earn-
ings. This section presents some descriptive evidence for the evolution of wealth
of households with different earnings from the 1996 and 2001 panels of the Survey
of Income and Program Participation. The analysis focuses on the household,
rather than the individual as unit for analysis and selects a sample of middle-
aged households that are unlikely to be in transitory stages of their life. We start
by describing the estimation sample, and proceed to investigate how wealth and
long-term earning ability map empirically into median saving outcomes. Finally,
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we document the age profile of the conditional on observed earnings net worth
distribution, and demonstrate that a calibrated version of the model is able to
account for the documented facts. We conclude that, while stylized, the model
presents a data-consistent description of households’ life-cyclical wealth dynamics.
3.5.1 Data and summary statistics
The SIPP is a US household-based survey running since 1984. It comes in a series
of 3-to-4-year panels, each featuring a different nationally representative sample
of households. A household is interviewed once every four months and upon the
interview data on demographic, income and employment-related (among others)
outcomes are collected for each household member retrospectively at monthly
level over the latest four months. Comprehensive data on the stocks of assets and
liabilities at household level is collected once a year during the interviews taking
place in the third, sixth, ninth and twelfth waves21(The 1996 panel consists of 12
waves, while the 2001 panel only consists of 9.). The first round of interviews for
the 1996 (2001) panel took place between August and November 1995 (February
2001 and June 2001). Wealth data was first collected between March and June
1996 (October 2001 and January 2002). At this stage 27120 (22099) households
were interviewed. Attrition resulted in only 22438 (20026) of these being followed
up until the last round of interviews.
Given the focus on long-term wealth dynamics, using the full panel sample
for the analysis is inappropriate. First, about 30% of the households are non-
family and some family households contain no spouse. Further, the composition
of some family households changes across the waves. Associating reported net
worth with the stock of accumulated life-cycle resources relevant for decisions in
these cases is flawed. Second, availability of wealth data at only annual frequency
21See Czajka et al. (2003) for a comprehensive comparison of the wealth information in the
SIPP and the other two major household surveys - PSID and SCF. While the SCF is widely
considered to contain the most comprehensive and reliable data on wealth, it is a cross sectional
survey. On the other hand, while the PSID has very long panel, in the few releases where wealth
data is collected it excludes assets in pension accounts which we perceive as fundamental for
life-cycle considerations.
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Table 3.5.1: Descriptive statistics, SIPP and sample for estimation
1996 2001
SIPP Sample SIPP Sample
Demographics
Age, head 49.817 43.239 50.340 43.914
(16.947) (7.317) (16.850) (7.451)
White, head .843 .895 .833 .881
(.364) (.306) (.372) (.323)
Retired, any .292 0 .287 0
(.455) (0) (.453) (0)
Enrolled, any .053 0 .047 0
(.224) (0) (.211) (0)
Household
Family .699 1 .693 1
(.458) (0) (.461) (0)
Married .548 1 .544 1
(.498) (0) (.498) (0)
Female, head .459 .297 .476 .346
(.498) (.457) (.499) (.476)
Education, head
< High school .199 .105 .167 .089
(.399) (.307) (.373) (.285)
High school .292 .286 .291 .265
(.455) (.452) (.454) (.441)
< Degree .280 .293 .289 .300
(.449) (.455) (.453) (.458)
Degree + .229 .317 .254 .346
(.420) (.465) (.435) (.476)
Wealth/Earnings
Earnings 33676.94 59682.43 36217.97 64201.19
(39559.54) (43952.64) (40952.39) (46521.17)
Income 41571.06 65805.93 44097.34 67532.04
(38521.82) (47156.46) (39742.95) (48086.64)
Net worth 117452.7 122067.2 144091.5 160955.0
(507787.7) (290673.4) (560610.7) (284907.2)
Observations 27120 4946 22099 4780
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suggests that the analysis should also take place at annual frequency. Constructing
consistent annual earnings from monthly observations requires that households
are interviewed continuously during the length of the panel. Third, households
where the head or spouse is retired or in full-time education are likely to be in
transitory phases of their life with respect to saving decisions. In view of these,
the sample is restricted to married family households, with the same household
head and spouse over the panel duration, interviewed in every wave of the survey,
both the household head and the spouse are between 30 and 59 years old and
neither is enrolled in full time education or retired22. The subsample used in
what follows thus contains 4946 households from the 1996 panel (4780 households
from the 2001 panel), observed annually for four (three) consecutive years. Table
3.5.1 presents some descriptive statistics for the full SIPP sample (from the cross-
section of observations at the time of the third wave interview, when asset data
was first collected) and the sample for estimation23. Unsurprisingly (e.g. see
Table 1 in Alan et al. (2015)), the two samples represent distinct populations. On
average, households in the estimation sample are younger, more highly educated,
wealthier, and earn more than those in the full SIPP sample. Earnings represent
the overwhelming share of their total income.
Next, turn attention to the cross sectional distribution of net worth and earn-
ings. To summarize two aspects of these, we estimate non-parametrically the
distribution of net worth reported in the first wave of the survey conditional on
average annual earnings over the sample period, as well as the distribution of
annual earnings conditional on net worth24. Figure 3.5.1 presents contour plots
for the estimated conditional CDFs with the curves on the graph representing the
quantiles of the conditional distribution functions.
22This sampling decision is consistent with prior studies (e.g. see Dynan et al. (2004) and
Alan et al. (2015)).
23Henceforth, all income and wealth related quantities are reported in real terms after being
deflated using CPI.
24The estimation uses the method of Li and Racine (2008), and employs Epanechnikov kernels
and data-driven bandwidth selection. The procedure favours bandwidths close to 10000 real
dollars for both variables but the results are robust under moderate deviations from this. The
reasons for using such specification are briefly discussed below.
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The top panels of the figure plot the quantiles of net worth conditional on
earnings. Net worth is highly disperse and its dispersion increases with earnings.
Up to the middle 80 percent, the distribution for high-earners dominates the one
for low-earners. Top quantiles expand significantly while the 10th percentile is
nearly constant over the distribution of earnings.
The bottom panels plot the quantiles of earnings conditional on net worth.
Households around zero net worth earn least on average, in particular, less than
households in net debt25. To explore this more closely, Table 3.5.2 reports the
average earnings, age, and educational attainment of household heads and spouses
for households grouped in seven categories increasing in net worth. The results
for earnings are consistent with the pattern identified by the bottom panel of
Figure 3.5.1. Households within the bottom 25 percent of the sample are similar
in terms of age, and average age increases across net worth quartiles. Average
educational attainment tracks closely the pattern in earnings. Households in the
left tail of the distribution are not only high earners relative to those at zero net
worth, but also more highly educated. The 5 percent of households in the left
tail have educational attainment comparable to the second quartile, yet they are
somewhat younger and earn less. Households around zero net worth have the
worst educational record and are predictably the lowest earners. The pattern
implies that high earning households incur costly expenditures early in life unlike
low-earners of similar wealth. As demonstrated in Section 3.4, costly education
provides an explanation for this observation.
3.5.2 Dynamics of wealth over the distribution of earnings
This section describes the empirical relationship between observed household sav-
ing outcomes on one hand, and permanent earnings, net worth and age, on the
25It is well known that kernel-based methods suffer from boundary bias. As observations get
more disperse near the limits of the marginal distributions’ support distant observations become
disproportionately influential and bias the estimator towards the mean. An Epanechnikov kernel
does not eliminate the bias but has compact support and hence uses no information from distant
observations. Hence, given the shape of the quantiles, the non-monotonicity in the relationship
is, if anything, more strongly pronounced than suggested by the graph.
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other. The purpose of the exercise is twofold. First, it seeks to assess the adequacy
of the model’s implications for wealth dynamics, summarized in Figure 3.3.2, in
reduced form, when permanent earnings are appropriately accounted for. To the
extent that the model is seen as a description of data-generating process, reduced-
form estimation of (3.13) is informative of the models broader adequacy. Further,
wealth dynamics in a wide class of life-cycle models is driven by a mapping from
permanent earnings, net worth, and age into saving outcomes. Reduced-form es-
timation of such mapping’s empirical counterpart is informative about the aspects
in which different frameworks are able to account for the data. We exploit the
panel dimension of the data to construct proxies for permanent earnings and ex-
plicit measures of household saving based on observed changes of net worth across
periods.
Given the panel’s short duration, explicit total saving of individual households
is observed only over a period of three or four years. It is plausible that house-
holds with given permanent earnings will have a much more variable distribution
of annual as opposed to long-term saving outcomes. Given this and the likeli-
hood of extreme observations we choose to model the median of the conditional
distribution. Formally, we are interested in estimating
Median(Ai,t+1 − Ai,t) = F (Ai,t, wˆi, agei,t) (3.15)
where wˆ is appropriately defined measure of permanent earnings26. We confine
attention to linear in parameters form for F (.) but allow for the form of the
linear dependence to differ across specifications (see below). Two key issues are
apparent immediately. First, observed net worth at time t enters on both sides.
As measurement error is likely in net worth records, direct estimation of (3.15)
26Recall that in the model saving is age-independent conditional on wealth. It should be
noted that this is, first, inconsistent with standard versions of the life-cycle model and, second,
obtains as retirement plans rather than age determine expected lifetime income. Including age27
as a regressor in (3.15) allows for testing the relevance of this implication; furthermore, if age
effects are actually important, accounting for them is desirable in modelling the relationship of
interest.
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will identify severely downwards biased relationship (in addition to the standard
measurement error problems for quantile regression). Second, permanent earnings
are unobserved and have to be predicted at a first stage in a way consistent so
that the second stage is estimated by a median regression.
To tackle measurement error in net worth we use lagged, rather than contem-
poraneous observations of net worth as regressors. In particular, the specifications
for the 1996 panel use Ai,t−2 instead of Ai,t as regressors, and the results from the
2001 panel use Ai,t−1 instead28. It should be noted that lagged net worth is not
treated as in instrument for current net worth. More precisely, consider two lags
of the discrete time counterpart of (3.13)
Ai,t+1 − Ai,t = e
r − 1
r
(rAi,t + wi − c(wi))
Ai,t − Ai,t−1 = e
r − 1
r
(rAi,t−1 + wi − c(wi))
and substitute the solution for Ai,t from the second equation into the first
Ai,t+1 − Ai,t = e
r(er − 1)
r
(rAi,t−1 + wi − c(wi))
The latter suggests that the relationship between Ai,t+1 − Ai,t and rAi,t−1 con-
ditional on permanent earnings is just scaling up the coefficients of the original
relationship by proportion er ≈ (1 + r). As long as the measurement error in
wealth is of the form (mei + mei,t) and mei,t is not serially correlated, this elimi-
nates the bias due to Ai,t entering both sides of the equation.
In order to construct proxies for permanent earnings we follow the literature
and instrument current earnings in a first stage including the instruments as well
as the other second-stage regressors. We consider as instruments lagged labour
income and education. Education is likely a suitable instrument as it does not
vary considerably in the population of middle aged households and is strongly
28Recall, that the data contains four net worth observations for the 1996 panel and three for
the 2001 panel.
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related to permanent labour income. In particular, we use the interaction of the
education levels (grouped into four categories) of the household head and spouse.
Lagged earnings are likely correlated with the permanent component of earnings,
however, they also include lagged transitory shocks. It is intuitive that the longer
the lag the more convincing the instrument is. Given the length of the SIPP
panel the longest lag we can use is three years in the 1996 data and two years in
the 2001 data (that is instrument earnings at t + 1 with earnings at t − 2 in the
1996 panel and t− 1 in the 2001 panel) but this is likely sufficient for household-
level data29. As an empirical justification for the suitability of the instruments,
note that Dynan et al. (2004) find permanent income proxies based on measures
of education, lagged earnings or consumption to imply very similar conclusions
about the relationship between savings and permanent income in three different
US surveys. Once the first-stage equation is estimated the permanent earnings
proxies are constructed as the fitted-values at constant age.
To limit the influence of extreme earnings observations, the first-stage is also
fitted by LAD. The whole two-stage procedure, originally proposed by Amemiya
(1982), gives rise to the double-stage least absolute deviations (DSLAD) estimator.
Following his suggestion, we redefine the dependent variable for the second stage
as p∆At + (1 − p)∆̂At, where ∆At ≡ At+1 − At, ∆̂At is the fitted value from a
median regression of ∆At on all explanatory variables from the first stage, and
p ∈ [0, 1] is a value chosen by the econometrician30. Consistently with Amemiya
(1982) second-stage estimates are reported for two different values of p - 0.2 and
0.5 - but we also implement robustness checks using other values, including p = 1.
In all results that follow we report bootstrapped standard errors based on 1000
pairwize replications.
29For example, Blundell et al. (2008) find no evidence of a moving average component in
excess of MA(1) in income growth data from the PSID.
30This reformulation of the dependent variable was suggested by Amemiya (1982) as a gen-
eralisation of a 2SLS property. While no formal procedure for choosing p was proposed, it was
suggested that p in the range of 0.2 to 0.5 leads to an estimator that significantly outperforms
p = 1 in terms of efficiency. Kim and Muller (2004) later demonstrated that the choice of p is
inconsequential in median regressions except in very small samples.
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3.5.2.1 Estimation results
Given the above discussion we start by estimating two separate first-stage LAD
regressions - one to construct our proxies and another to obtain ∆̂At. We estimate
them separately to insure against potential correlation between the error terms.
The results are reported in Table 3.C.1. Unsurprisingly, the instruments are highly
relevant and there is a significant (although small in magnitude) age effect. We
construct the permanent earnings proxy as the prediction from the first equation
at constant age (the mean age in each sample) and split households into four
quartiles based on this measure. To allow for non-linear relationship we introduce
permanent earnings in the second stage through a quartile indicator. Note that
while the proxy likely suffers from measurement error, this has no consequences for
the estimation as long as permanent-earnings quartiles are identified consistently.
As a baseline specification for the conditional median we estimate a second
stage of observed wealth changes on permanent earnings quartile indicator, lagged
net worth (included linearly) and age categories. Table 3.5.3 (3.5.4) reports the
estimated coefficients for p = 0.2 (p = 0.5). Columns (1) to (5) ((6) to (10))
are estimated in the 1996 (2001) sample. The first specification (columns (1) and
(6)) introduces permanent earnings through the proxy linearly, while the other
columns allow for non-linearity by using quartile indicators. The second specifi-
cation (columns (3) and (8)) allows for non-linear relationship with respect to net
worth (including a square term) - the estimated coefficient is close to and insignif-
icantly different from zero. Columns (4) and (9) further allow for an interaction of
net worth and age, and yield estimates close to and insignificantly different from
zero. The last specification (columns (5) and (10)) allows for interaction of net
worth with earnings quartiles and yields coefficients insignificant from zero31.
As a further illustration of the results Figure 3.5.2 plots the predicted median
saving for the four earnings categories (obtained from columns (2) and (6) of Ta-
bles 3.5.3 3.5.4) against the median value of the proxy variable in each category,
31For all specifications we include all second-stage regressors in the first stage. The respective
first-stage coefficients are also found insignificant. Results are not reported for brevity.
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Figure 3.5.2: Earnings categories coefficients
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holding age and net worth constant. The profiles are increasing and approxi-
mately linear. Interpreted directly through the model, such earnings profiles are
consistent with approximately constant saving rates out of permanent earnings.
To allow for further flexibility of the functional form we split the households
of each permanent earning category into four quartiles of observed lagged net
worth and estimate a second-stage median regression of total savings on the in-
teraction of the identified permanent earnings and net worth quartiles, as well as
age indicators. This relaxes the assumptions of linear wealth effect and separabil-
ity between wealth and earnings on the right-hand side, hence allowing for much
more general functional forms. The estimated second-stage coefficients (which
identify median savings for the respective group of households) are reported in
Table 3.C.2 and plotted in Figure 3.5.3 against the median lagged net worth of
the respective groups of households. Inspection of results suggests that the extra
flexibility allowed brings little extra insight. The wealth profiles are similar across
permanent-earnings quartiles and approximately linear, reasserting the previous
results.
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Figure 3.5.3: Median saving by permanent earnings/wealth category, conditional
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In summary, median total saving increases substantially and significantly with
permanent earnings. Saving is positively associated with net worth and the re-
lationship is adequately approximated as linear; the coefficient of proportionality
is within the magnitude of the real interest rate; and is approximately constant
across age and permanent earnings groups. Households with high permanent
earnings move quickly to the right of the net worth distribution and over time
accumulate significantly larger stocks of wealth as compared to their less-earning
counterparts. Conditional on permanent earnings and net worth, the differences in
saving of households of different age are statistically insignificant. These results
are strongly suggestive of the adequacy of (3.13) as describing household-level
wealth dynamics. In particular, the model’s implications for saving behaviour
account for the observed saving outcomes in reduced form. Interestingly, the ap-
parent age-invariance of saving and the increasing relationship with net worth
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(conditional on age and earnings) are not only supportive of the model, but also
at odds with the implications of canonical life-cycle models32. While purely de-
scriptive, the results are suggestive for the model’s adequacy in explaining house-
holds’ median saving outcomes and the evolution of wealth distributions in the
presence of permanent earnings differentials and heterogeneity in initial wealth
endowments.
3.5.3 The distribution of wealth and earnings
We next turn attention to the age profile of the conditional-on-earnings net worth
distribution. We split the sample households into three age groups - [30, 40),
[40, 50), and [50, 60) - and estimate non-parametrically the net worth distribution
conditional on earnings. Figure 3.5.4 presents the associated contour maps. The
basic pattern identified in Figure 3.5.1 is still present and a few additional obser-
vations emerge. First, the distribution of net worth gets increasingly dispersed
with age. Second, the higher dispersion is driven by lengthening of the right tail
while the 10th percentile is relatively stable. Third, the increase in dispersion
is more pronounced at high earnings. Fourth, the 10th conditional percentile is
stable for low-earnings households and only increases with age at high earnings.
This pattern is qualitatively consistent with the model’s predictions (Section
3.3) as long as preference parameters imply positive relationship between savings
and earnings over the empirical support of the distribution. In particular, the
”absorbing” property of low wealth is consistent with the data and the level of
wealth where savings average zero is negatively related to earnings. To give some
concrete substance to this claim we conduct the following exercise. First, we
obtain the 10th, 50th and 90th percentile of wealth for households aged [40, 50)
and [50, 60) in the four earnings quartiles. Then, using the observed earnings and
net worth of households aged [30, 40), we use the model to simulate their net worth
32In standard life-cycle models a wealthy household saves less than a wealth poor household
of the same permanent income and age. Further, the mapping from net worth and permanent
income onto saving is age-dependent.
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Table 3.5.5: Observed and fitted wealth quantiles
2001
Data Model
E1 E2 E3 E4 E1 E2 E3 E4
Age 40-49
Q10 -6841 2827 15247 49527 -7537 490 12817 41715
Q25 2167 20528 51319 126931 6075 19476 41980 104865
Q50 22477 67590 113063 232817 18979 51134 89908 223971
Q75 76266 158469 206203 410325 66971 117125 180800 434227
Q90 168246 260598 394196 703753 154617 224718 299780 686177
Age 50-59
Q10 -4889 2625 10582 91449 -5422 15411 38913 88305
Q25 6078 33789 66748 178388 14313 43135 83978 187528
Q50 42096 91965 157163 330204 36894 90350 156483 371581
Q75 118628 202918 330131 596526 109036 190570 289049 685259
Q90 233016 372957 468283 979331 241446 350457 467381 1062598
1996
Data Model
E1 E2 E3 E4 E1 E2 E3 E4
Age 40-49
Q10 -3182 912 5436 25902 -724 931 15424 30440
Q25 1947 15808 36059 62030 8815 23007 35035 69435
Q50 23211 46145 76251 139241 23302 47526 67208 130543
Q75 69531 97289 150125 275295 62076 96854 132254 223013
Q90 151776 174502 248018 512001 103201 164046 218501 448159
Age 50-59
Q10 -1843 11732 25291 42452 7443 14096 42565 74693
Q25 11660 37942 58883 93251 21370 48390 70532 130653
Q50 49798 90335 128139 202956 42722 86969 120161 224257
Q75 110797 157556 238351 400601 101073 158677 217278 365676
Q90 231892 301952 398360 666746 160582 259395 345046 713299
10 and 20 years into the future for different values of ub. The simulations, as in the
model, assume that earnings remain constant over time and that preferences are
given by a log-utility function. We choose the value (ub = 1.029) that minimizes
the sum of absolute deviations between simulated and observed median net-worth
levels of the four earnings quartiles in the 2001 sample by equally weighting each
of the resulting 8 targets. Table 3.5.5 reports the observed and simulated quantiles
of net worth by earnings and age group, using the same parameterisation in the
1996 sample. Further, as before we estimate non-parametrically the conditional
distribution of net worth on the simulated data and present the associated contour
plots in Figure 3.5.5.
Before interpreting the results a discussion is in order. First, this procedure
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makes no difference between permanent and transitory earnings components - ob-
served earnings are treated as a proxy for long term earnings. Second, it abstracts
from possible heterogeneity in preference parameters in the population. Third,
the model is extremely parsimonious - the above exercise amounts to fitting 8
targets by varying a single parameter. Fourth, as reflected in Table 3.5.5 the pro-
cedure systematically underestimates the wealth accumulation over the first ten
years, with an offsetting error over the next ten-year period. Subject to this, the
simulated wealth profiles fit their empirical counterparts closely and the simulated
conditional quantiles in Figure 3.5.5 are very close to their observed counterparts
in Figure 3.5.4. It should be noted that by considering quantiles rather than mo-
ments we make no attempt to describe extreme wealth observations - an issue that
has attracted considerable attention in the literature and that dominates measures
of inequality based on statistics such as the Gini index. There are, however, good
reasons to think that extreme wealth accumulation is not best understood as a
life-cyclical phenomenon33. The results suggest that wealth dynamics could be ad-
equately attributed to pure life-cycle motives when retirement is efficient; wealth
inequality reflects earnings inequality to a significant extent; while highly stylized,
the theoretical description of wealth dynamics in Section 3.3 provides an adequate
approximation to the data.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper studies the labour-market decisions of risk-averse workers in a world
of frictional labour markets. The existence of labour-market rigidities imply that
the tradeoff between consumption and leisure is resolved over the life cycle, with
individuals working while young and saving in order to retire later. The model
has highly tractable implications for wealth dynamics and educational invest-
ment which emphasise pure life-cycle motives, labour-market decisions (including
optimal retirement), persistent earnings differentials and heterogeneity in initial
33See Carroll (2000) for a discussion.
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wealth endowments. Using data from the Survey of Income and Program Partic-
ipation we document how the household-level distribution of wealth and earnings
evolves with age and how permanent earnings and wealth associate with me-
dian saving outcomes. The theoretical framework provides clear interpretation
for the observed regularities. The evidence is suggestive that life-cycle motives
and permanent-earnings heterogeneity are accountable for a significant part of the
between-household differences in wealth.
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Appendix
3.A Proofs and derivations
3.A.1 Derivation of Bellman equations
Let ∆ be a discrete interval of time and V (A,w) ≡ max{Ve(A,w), V n(A,w)}.
Consider an employed worker with {A,w}. Her discrete-time Bellman equation
is (suppressing the second argument for brevity)
V e(A) = max
c
{u(c)∆ + 1
1 + r∆
V (A′)}
where
A′ = (1 + r∆)A+ w∆− c∆
Multiplying both sides by (1 + r∆) and subtracting V (A,w)
rV e(A) = max
c
{u(c) + V (A
′)− V (A)
∆
+ ru(c)∆}
In the limit as ∆ approaches 0 this implies (3.2).
Consider a worker with {A,w} such that V (A,w) = V n(A,w). Her discrete-
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time Bellman equation is
V n(A) = max

maxc≥0[u(c)∆ + ub∆ + 11+r∆V
n(A′np)]
maxc≥0[u(c)∆ + 11+r∆(λ∆ max(V
n(A′js), V
e(A′js))+
+(1− λ∆)V n(A′js))]

where the maximization is conditional on
A′np = (1 + r∆)A− c∆
A′js = (1 + r∆)A+ b∆− c∆
(3.16)
Multiplying both sides by (1 + r∆) and subtracting V (A,w)
rV n(A) = max

maxc≥0[u(c) + ub +
V n(A′np)−V n(A)
∆
]
maxc≥0[u(c) +
V n(A′js)−V n(A)
∆
+ λmax(V e(A′js)− V n(A′js), 0)]

In the limit as ∆ approaches 0 this implies (3.1).
3.A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Under property 1 the Bellman equation for an employed worker can be stated as
rV e(A,w) = max
 maxc≥0[u(c) +
∂V e(A,w)
∂A
(rA+ w − c)]
u(rA) + ub
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Under the conjecture
rV (A,w) =

u(rA+ w) if A ≤ AE
u(c∗) + (rA+ w − c∗)u′(c∗) if A ∈ (AE, A¯E)
u(rA) + ub if A ≥ A¯E
Suppose A ≤ AE. The Bellman equation of the worker is then
rV e(A,w) = max{max
c
[u(c) + u′(rA+ w)(rA+ w − c)], u(rA) + ub}
Maximization implies that optimal consumption is ce = rA + w. Substituting
above
rV e(A,w) = max
 u(rA+ w)u(rA) + ub

The payoff from permanent retirement is not defined for negative wealth, hence
working forever dominates if AE ≤ 0 or if A < 0 < AE. Suppose 0 < A < AE.
Then both payoff functions increase in A and the payoff from retirement increases
faster. At A = AE, u(rA + w) = u(c∗) and u(rA) + ub = u(c∗ − w) + ub =
u(c∗−w) +wu′(c∗). As u(.) is convex, u(c∗)−u(c∗−w)−wu′(c∗) > 0. Therefore,
working forever dominates and rV e(A,w) = u(rA+ w) as conjectured.
Consider A ∈ (AE, A¯E). The Bellman equation under the conjecture is
rV e(A,w) = max
 maxc [u(c) + u
′(c∗)(rA+ w − c)]
u(rA) + ub

Optimal consumption is c = c∗. Substituting above
rV e(A,w) = max
 u(c
∗) + u′(c∗)(rA+ w − c∗)
u(rA) + ub

At the upper bound of the subset u(c∗) + u′(c∗)(rA¯E + w − c∗) = u(c∗) + ub =
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u((rA¯E)+ub, while the derivatives of the payoffs with respect to A satisfy ru
′(c∗) <
ru′(rA) within the interior of the set. Hence saving for retirement dominates and
rV e(A,w) = u(c∗) + u′(c∗)(rA+ wic∗) as conjectured.
Finally, suppose A ≥ A¯E. Under the conjecture the Bellman equation is
rV e(A,w) = max
 maxc [u(c) + u
′(rA)(rA+ w − c)]
u(rA) + ub

Optimal consumption is c = rA. Substituting above
rV (A,w) = max
 u(rA) + u
′(rA)w
u(rA) + ub

As rA > c∗ not working is strictly preferred and the conjecture is verified.
This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
3.A.3 Characterisation of V n and solution
Consider a non-employed worker with {A,w}. As she freely changes state between
non-participation and job-search, (3.1) and property 1 suggest that the worker
optimally seeks employment when bV nA (A,w) + λ(V
e(A,w)− V n(A,w)) ≥ ub and
does not participate otherwise. Let
S(A,w) ≡ bu′(cn(A,w)) + λ(V e(A,w)− V n(A,w)) (3.17)
Consider a non-employed worker at the natural borrowing limit, A = −b/r.
It is immediate that the only behaviour not violating the limit is to search for a
job and consume nothing. The Inada condition implies that S(−b/r, w) tends to
infinity. Let AU > −b/r be an amount of wealth such that S(A,w) > ub,∀A ∈
[−b/r, AU), i.e. job search dominates for all amounts of wealth below AU . Then
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for any A ∈ [−b/r, AU) the Bellman equation (3.1) reduces to
(r + λ)V n(A) = u(cn(A)) + u′(cn(A))(rA+ b− cn(A)) + λV e(A) (3.18)
Total differentiation of (3.18) with respect to time yields
[u′′(cn(A))c˙n(A) + λ(V eA(A)− V nA (A))]A˙ = 0 (3.19)
One possibility for optimal wealth and consumption dynamics is to consume all
income, implying cn(A,w) = rA + b and A˙ = 0. It is later verified that this
is never optimal in the interior of [−b/r, AU). Alternatively, consider the set of
strategies implying A˙ < 0. Then by (3.19)
c˙n(A) =
λ(u′(cn(A))− u′(ce(A))
u′′(cn(A))
(3.20)
Over the duration of a job search spell consumption is declining over time.
Lemma 1. Optimality of job search
There exists a unique AU < A¯E such that job search is strictly preferred to non-
participation for all A ∈ [−b/r, AU) and S(AU , .) = bu′(cn(AU , .)) +λ(V e(AU , .)−
V n(AU , .)) = ub.
Proof. Differentiation of (3.17) with respect to A implies
SA(A) = bu
′′(cn(A,w))cnA(A) + λ(u
′(ce(A))− u′(cn(A))) < 0
and as already established job search is strictly preferred to non-participation at
the borrowing limit:
lim
A→−b/r
S(A) > ub
In the limit as A tends to A¯E property 1 and proposition 1 imply that non-
participation is strictly preferred to job search. Therefore there exists a unique
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AU such that S(A) > ub, ∀A ∈ [−b/r, AU) and S(AU) = bu′(cn(AU))+λ(V e(AU)−
V n(AU)) = ub.
The dynamics of consumption of unemployed workers over the interval A ∈
[−b/r, AU) is illustrated in Figure 3.2.2. The set of {A, cn} pairs where wealth is
stationary are identified by the locus 0 = rA+b−cn(A), represented by a straight
line with slope r in the (A, c)-plane, with cn(−b/r) = 0. Points below the line
are consistent with wealth accumulation and points above imply decumulation.
On the other hand, equation (3.20), suggests that consumption is in steady state
when cn(A, .) = ce(A), increases above the locus, and decreases below. The stable
saddle path consistent with the terminal condition cn(−b/r) = 0 therefore lies
between the A˙ = 0 and c˙n = 0 loci and prescribes decreasing consumption and
wealth during job search. The identified saddle path illustrated, however, only
applies within the interval A ∈ [−b/r, AU).
As 0 < b < w, there exists a unique level of A, henceforth denoted ASS,
where both consumption and wealth are at steady state, and furthermore ASS ∈
(AE, A¯
E). It is straightforward to verify that ASS = (c∗− b)/r, AU < ASS and in-
deed optimal saving behaviour during job-search involves wealth decumulation34.
Lemma 1 suggests that to the right of AU there exists a neighbourhood,
ANP≥JS, where non-participation weakly dominates job search. Differentiation
of (3.17) with respect to A and evaluation at any point in ANP≥JS implies
∂S(A|A ∈ ANP≥JS)
∂A
= bu′′(cn(A))
∂cn(A)
∂A
+ λ(u′(ce(A)− u′(cn(A))) < 0
under the assumptions (verified below) that consumption of non-employed is lower
than that for employed and non-decreasing with wealth. Then non-participation
is strictly preferred to job search for all A > AU .
Consider a non-employed worker with A > AU . As she optimally chooses
34Is job search still optimal at ASS? Suppose so. Then S(ASS) = u′(c∗)( br+λwr+λ ) =
ub(
br+λw
wr+wλ ) < ub which is a contradiction.
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non-participation, her value function reduces to
rV n(A) = u(cn(A)) + ub + u
′(cn(A))(rA− cn(A))
Totally differentiating with respect to time
u′′(cn(A))c˙n(A)(rA− cn(A)) = 0 (3.21)
identifying two potentially optimal consumption/saving strategies. One possibil-
ity is to consume all income, cn(A) = rA (Strategy i). As this implies A˙ = 0,
if ever optimal this is optimal forever. Substituting into the value function the
discounted lifetime payoff is
rV n(A|i) = u(rA) + ub. (3.22)
Alternatively, (3.21) holds if cnA(A) = 0 implying c
n(A) = cn(AU) and wealth
decumulates35. The discounted lifetime payoff is
rV n(A|ii) = u(cn(AU)) + ub + u′(cn(AU))(rA− cn(AU))
= rV n(AU) + r(A− AU)u′(cn(AU)) (3.23)
Let A¯U ≡ cn(AU)/r. Note that Strategy ii) is only feasible when A ≤ A¯U as
consuming cn(AU) implies wealth accumulation for higher A.
Lemma 2. Optimality of non-participation
A non-employed worker optimally chooses to not participate and decumulate wealth
if and only if A ∈ [AU , A¯U ]. Her value is function described by (3.23).
A non-employed worker optimally chooses to not participate and consume all in-
come if and only if A > A¯U . Her value function is described by (3.22).
35Another possible strategy consistent with (3.21) is identified by cnA(A) = 0 and A˙ > 0. Such
strategies are never optimal as worker never changes state yet does not maximize consumption
but instead accumulates wealth indefinitely.
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Proof. Let
T (A) ≡ rV n(A|ii)− rV n(A|i) = u(cn(AU))− u(rA) + u′(cn(AU))(rA− cn(AU))
Evaluating at A = AU and rearranging
T (AU)
cn(AU)− rAU =
u(cn(AU))− u(rAU)
cn(AU)− rAU − u
′(cn(AU)) > 0
where the inequality follows from the fact that cn(AU) > rAU (recall figure 3.2.2)
and concavity of u(.).
Differentiation of T (.) with respect to A yields
∂T (A)
∂A
= r(u′(cn(AU)− u′(rA)) ≤ 0,∀A ∈ [AU , A¯U ]
with equality at A¯U . The inequality follows by the definition of A¯U .
Evaluating T (.) at A = A¯U yields T (A¯U) = 0. Therefore T (A) ≥ 0,∀A ∈
[AU , A¯U ] and strategy ii is optimal within this interval. Furthermore, strategy ii
is infeasible for A > A¯U implying the optimality of strategy i. This completes the
proof of Lemma 2.
The analysis in this section fully characterises the solution of a non-employed
worker’s problem conditional on Property 1 and implies Proposition 2.
3.A.4 Proof of Theorem 1
Conditional on Property 1 the strategies described by Propositions 1 and 2 solve
the Bellman equations (3.1) and (3.2) by construction. Next, we verify that the
conjectured solution implies Property 1 as well.
Sufficient condition for Property 1 is V e(A) > V n(A),∀A < A¯E. Since c∗ >
cn(AU) (Figure 3.2.2), A¯E > A¯U . Further, V e(A¯E) = V n(A¯E) by Proposition 1.
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Since cn(A) < ce(A),∀A < A¯E (Figure 3.2.3), it follows that u′(ce(A)) <
u′(cn(A)) and equivalently V eA(A) < V
n
A (A),∀A < A¯E.
Hence both V e(A) and V n(A) are increasing with A and V n(A) is increasing
at a higher rate over A < A¯E. Therefore, V e(A) > V n(A),∀A < A¯E and Property
1 holds.
3.B Education efficiency frontier
For brevity let ”forever-workers”, ”savers”, and ”retirees” describe workers whose
optimal strategy is to work forever, save for retirement and retire. The derivation
of the education efficiency frontier proceeds by analysing the choice of education
of workers based on their optimal employment strategies conditional on investing
in education or not.
3.B.1 Forever-workers without education
Consider the set of workers whose optimal strategy would be to work forever if
they chose to obtain no education. They are identified by the set of abilities and
wealth endowments
FW0 ≡ {A0, w0|rA0 ≤ c∗0 − w0}
Should they invest in education instead their optimal strategy might be to either
work forever or to save for retirement36.
3.B.1.1 Forever-workers with education
The subset
FW FW0 ≡ {A0, w0|rA0 ≤ min{c∗0 − w0, c∗1 − w0(1 + e) + rk}}
36Investment in education involves a depletion of wealth and an increase in c∗, consumption
during the wealth accumulation phase. Therefore a forever worker or saver without education
is never an immediate retiree with education.
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identifies forever-workers irrespective of education choice. They never enjoy leisure
so their decision is driven solely by comparison of consumption possibilities with
and without education. The latter depends both on wealth and earnings which
are perfectly substitutable, and the benefit from extra earnings, w0e, is enjoyed in
perpetuity. A worker optimally invests in education if and only if the perpetuity-
discounted value of the extra flow of earnings exceeds the cost of education
w0e
r
≥ k (3.24)
Conditional on belonging to FW FW0 optimality of education is independent of
the wealth endowment. Workers with sufficiently high ability w0 > rk/e always
pursue a degree. Less able workers, do not. The strict-equality counterpart of
(3.24) identifies the education efficiency frontier over FW FW0 .
3.B.1.2 Savers with education
The relative complement of FW FW0 in FW0
FW S0 ≡ {A0, w0|rA0 ∈ (c∗1 − w0(1 + e) + rk, c∗0 − w0]}
identifies forever-workers without education who save for retirement if they had
education. The set is non-empty as long as c∗1 − c∗0 < w0e − rk for some w037.
Since c∗(w) is increasing in w existence requires w0e − rk > 0, i.e. all members
of FW S0 lie above the education efficiency frontier for FW
FW
0 . The value with
education always exceeds the value without as
u(c∗1) +
(
rA1 + w1 − c∗1
w1
)
ub > u(c
∗
1) > u(c
∗
0) ≥ u(rA0 + w0)
37The existence of this and some subsequently discussed sets depends on the form of prefer-
ences (see (3.10)). Figure 3.4.1 illustrates just one special case. For example, if risk aversion is
low and the worker has weak preference for leisure, FWS0 may be empty.
132
With education these workers achieve both higher consumption and the prospect
of enjoying leisure some time in the future hence always invest.
In summary, workers who would work forever without education, optimally
choose to pursue a degree if and only if w0 ≥ rk/e. Subject to this, their wealth
endowment is irrelevant.
3.B.2 Savers without education
Consider the set of workers whose optimal strategy would be to save for retirement
if they chose to obtain no education. They are identified by the set
S0 ≡ {A0, w0|rA0 ∈ (c∗0 − w0, c∗0)}
Should they invest in education instead their optimal strategy might be to either
work forever or save for retirement.
3.B.2.1 Forever-workers with education
The subset
SFW0 ≡ {A0, w0|rA0 ∈ (c∗0 − w0,min{c∗0, c∗1 − w0(1 + e) + rk})}
identifies the workers who would work forever were they to invest in education.
To trade the perspective of future leisure they need sufficient increases in con-
sumption.
SFW0 is never empty. Consider a worker with w0 = rk/e and rA0 = c
∗
0(rk/e)−
rk/e. This worker belongs to FW0 and is just indifferent between working forever
and saving for retirement, as well as between investing or not investing in educa-
tion. In a neighbourhood to the right of (rk/e, c∗0(rk/e) − rk/e) (Figure 3.4.1),
workers belong to SFW0 (see discussion in section 3.B.1.2).
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Workers are indifferent to education if and only if
u(rA0 − rk + w0(1 + e))− u(c∗0) =
(rA0 + w0 − c∗0)
w0
ub (3.25)
that is if the gain in consumption just equals the discounted value of leisure they
forego. Totally differentiating (3.25) with respect to A0, the slope of the EEF is
∂w0
∂A0
∣∣∣∣
EF
=
rw0(u
′(c∗0)− u′(rA0 − rk + w0(1 + e)))
(rA0 − c∗0)u′(c∗0) + w0(1 + e)u′(rA0 − rk + w0(1 + e))
≥ 0
The inequality follows as both the numerator and the denominator are non-
negative. As without education the workers save for retirement, (3.25) implies
that c∗0 ≤ rA0 − rk + w0(1 + e). Workers are willing to trade their prospect for
future leisure only for a sufficiently large increase in consumption. As they work
forever with education, c∗1 ≥ rA0 − rk + w0(1 + e). Then for the denominator
(rA0 − c∗0)u′(c∗0) + w0(1 + e)u′(rA0 − rk + w0(1 + e)) ≥
(rA0 − c∗0)u′(c∗0) + w0(1 + e)u′(c∗1) =
(rA0 + w0 − c∗0)u′(c∗0) ≥ 0
In the limit as w0 = rk/e and rA0 approaches c
∗
0(rk/e) − rk/e, (3.25) holds
with equality and ∂w0/∂A0|EF approaches zero. The education efficiency frontier
for SFW0 follows continuously from the frontier of FW0 and describes an upward
sloping curve in the {A0, w0}-plane.
Savers enjoy the benefit of boosted income only in annuity until retirement.
Time to retirement declines with wealth and the wealthier a worker is, the larger is
her present value of future leisure. A wealthier worker requires a larger increase in
earnings to obtain education. As wealth increases workers indifferent to education
have higher and higher ability.
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3.B.2.2 Savers with education
The complement of SFW0 in S0
SS0 ≡ {A0, w0|rA0 ∈ (max{c∗0 − w0, c1 − w0(1 + e) + rk},min{c∗0, c∗1 + rk})}
identifies workers whose optimal strategy is to save for retirement irrespective of
education. The set is non-empty as long as c∗(w0) > c∗(w0(1+e))−w0(1+e)+rk
for some w0.
Workers are indifferent to education if and only if
(
(rA0 + w0 − c∗0)
w0
− (rA0 − rk + w0(1 + e)− c
∗
1)
(1 + e)w0
)
ub = u(c
∗
1)− u(c∗0) (3.26)
that is, if the gain in consumption (in utility terms) just equals the loss of dis-
counted value of leisure due to increase of time to retirement. Total differentiation
with respect to A0 implies
∂w0
∂A0
∣∣∣∣
EF
=
rw0(u
′(c∗0)− u′(c∗1))
u(c∗1)− u(c∗0)
> 0
The education efficiency frontier follows continuously from the one over SFW0 .
3.B.3 Retirees without education
Consider the set of workers whose optimal strategy would be to retire immediately
if they chose to obtain no education. They are identified by the set
R0 ≡ {A0, w0|rA0 ≥ c∗0}
Should they invest in education instead their optimal strategy might be to work
forever, save for retirement or still retire immediately.
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The subset
RR0 ≡ {A0, w0|rA0 ≥ c∗1 + rk}
identifies the workers who retire immediately with or without education. As
u(rA0) > u(rA0 − rk),∀A0 they never pursue a degree. If a worker retires imme-
diately, the benefit of boosted earnings is not realised at all.
The subset
RFW0 ≡ {A0, w0|rA0 ∈ [c∗0, c∗1 + rk − w0(1 + e))}
identifies the workers who optimally work forever if they chose education. This
set is non-empty.
Workers are indifferent to education if and only if
u(rA0) + ub = u(rA0 − rk + w0(1 + e)) (3.27)
Totally differentiating with respect to A0
∂w0
∂A0
∣∣∣∣
EF
=
r[u′(rA0)− u′(rA0 − rk + w0(1 + e))]
(1 + e)u′(rA0 − rk + w0(1 + e)) > 0
The inequality follows because over (3.27) a forever-worker consumes more than
a retiree for indifference to obtain.
The subset
RS0 ≡ {A0, w0|rA0 ∈ [max{c∗0, c∗1 − w0(1 + e) + rk}, c∗1 + rk}
identifies workers who save for retirement if they chose education. This set is
non-empty.
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Workers are indifferent to education if and only if
u(rA0) + ub = u(c
∗
1) + (rA0 − rk + w0(1 + e)− c∗1)u′(c∗1) (3.28)
Totally differentiating with respect to A0 and using (3.28)
∂w0
∂A0
∣∣∣∣
EF
=
rw0[u
′(rA0)− u′(c∗1)]
u(c∗1)− u′(rA0)
> 0
The inequality follows as over (3.28) a worker will delay enjoyment of leisure only
if they are able to attain higher consumption.
This completes the construction of the education efficiency frontier.
3.C Tables
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Table 3.C.1: First stage
1996 2001
Earningst Savingt Earningst Savingt
Earningst−2 0.755∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗
(0.018) (0.050)
Earningst−3 0.787∗∗∗ 0.098∗
(0.026) (0.043)
Education
HS,HS 1866.607 −3724.072 5330.778∗∗∗ −720.917
(1175.814) (2228.318) (974.846) (1520.350)
<D,HS 1753.077 −2423.443 6279.136∗∗∗ 4571.777
(1297.204) (2265.825) (1122.324) (3051.242)
D+,HS 5094.001∗∗∗ −8191.107∗ 10704.381∗∗∗ 1116.796
(1513.423) (4175.289) (1804.790) (5171.671)
HS,<D 2434.049 −2777.476 7644.515∗∗∗ 3352.449
(1386.715) (2797.656) (1251.744) (3016.435)
<D,<D 3700.294∗∗ −2735.786 8009.959∗∗∗ 948.949
(1295.635) (2137.584) (1096.206) (2618.186)
D+,<D 8031.511∗∗∗ 3276.548 10872.854∗∗∗ 3780.029
(1984.679) (3281.118) (1396.889) (4381.975)
HS,D+ 8414.996∗∗∗ 3052.624 11169.124∗∗∗ 3631.515
(2133.960) (5261.445) (2941.858) (6147.794)
<D,D+ 6793.264∗∗∗ −1380.225 9241.357∗∗∗ −3193.662
(1655.063) (2856.892) (1380.629) (4078.870)
D+,D+ 11651.517∗∗∗ 5503.179 14592.591∗∗∗ 8579.603∗
(1519.232) (3160.614) (1288.134) (3443.893)
Age
Age 1598.386∗∗∗ −168.115 1724.869∗∗∗ 42.241
(475.047) (1016.471) (470.307) (1081.641)
Age2 −18.508∗∗∗ 2.138 −19.290∗∗∗ −1.266
(5.490) (12.169) (5.349) (12.823)
Net wortht−1 0.005 0.027
(0.003) (0.018)
Net wortht−2 0.003 0.021
(0.003) (0.017)
Intercept −22299.932∗ 5553.979 −31880.985∗∗ −2442.103
(9893.479) (20919.004) (9959.012) (22287.167)
Num. obs. 4946 4946 4780 4780
Bootstrap standard errors. Education categories: <HS - no high school, HS - high school, <D - higher
education but no degree, D+ - at least a degree. First term in education interaction is household head’s
education category. Base category is <HS,<HS. Education categories that are insignificant in both
equations are omitted.
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